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  16.1	  Introduction	  	  In	  1922,	  Kurt	   Lewin	   (a	   leading	  German-­‐American	  psychologist,	   1890–1947)	  proposed	  the	  concept	  of	  “genidentity”	  to	  better	  understand	  identity	  through	  time.	  Lewin’s	  aim	  was	  to	   offer	   a	   conception	   of	   identity	   that	   would	   be	   relevant	   across	   different	   sciences,	  especially	   physics	   and	   biology	   (Lewin	   1922).	   Later,	   philosopher	   Hans	   Reichenbach	  (1891–1953)	   distinguished	   different	   conceptions	   of	   genidentity,	   and	   applied	   them	   to	  physical	  cases	  (Reichenbach	  [1956]	  1971).	  However,	  many	  philosophers	  and	  scientists	  have	   considered	   that	   Reichenbach’s	   view	   of	   genidentity	   was	   imprecise	   and,	  consequently,	   failed	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   identity	   of	   physical	   objects.	   In	   particular,	  Reichenbach’s	   account	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   apply	   to	   particles	   in	   nonrelativistic	   quantum	  mechanics,	   a	  domain	   in	  which	   trajectories	  and	  causation	  are	  problematic	   (e.g.,	   French	  and	  Krause	  2006,	  48–49).	  Recently,	  a	  few	  philosophers	  have	  resorted	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  genidentity	   to	   reflect	   on	  mereology	   (e.g.,	   Smith	   and	  Mulligan	   1982),	   or	   to	   understand	  biological	   entities	   (e.g.,	   Boniolo	   and	   Carrara	   2004),	   but	   their	   views	   have	   not	   aroused	  much	   discussion	   in	   the	   philosophical	   community.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   examining	   several	  specific	   examples	   taken	   from	   current	   classical	   physics	   and	   biology,	   we	   defend	   the	  genidentity	  view	  and	  show	  that	  it	  would	  be	  fruitful	  to	  adopt	  it	  in	  at	  least	  some	  areas	  of	  those	  sciences.	  	  	  What	  does	  the	  concept	  of	  genidentity	  say?	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  it	  says	  that	  the	  identity	  through	  time	  of	  an	  entity	  X	  is	  given	  by	  the	  continuous	  connection	  of	  states	  through	  which	  X	  goes.	  For	  example,	  a	  “chair”	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  purely	  historical	  way,	  as	  a	  connection	  of	  spatiotemporal	  states	  from	  its	  making	  to	  its	  destruction.	  In	  this	  view,	  the	  individual	  X	  is	  never	  presupposed	  or	  given	  initially,	  because	  the	  starting	  point	  is	  the	  decision	  to	  follow	  a	   specific	   and	   appropriate	  process	  P,	   and	   the	   individual	   X	   supervenes	   on	   this	   process.	  For	  example	  (as	  detailed	  below),	  one	  can	  decide	  to	  follow	  the	  conservation	  of	  an	  internal	  physiological	  organization	  through	  time,	  and	  the	  effectuation	  of	  this	  process	  gives	  us	  our	  individual	   entity	   (in	   this	   case,	   an	   individual	   organism).	   In	   other	   words,	   for	   the	  genidentity	  view,	  what	  we	  single	  out	  as	  an	  “individual”	   is	  always	   the	  byproduct	  of	   the	  
activity	   that	   is	   being	   followed,	   not	   its	   prior	   foundation	   (not	   a	   presumed	   “thing”	   that	  would	   give	   its	   unity	   to	   this	   activity).	   (Of	   course	   not	   every	   sequence	   of	   events	   is	  associated	   with	   an	   individual,	   as	   explained	   below.)	   A	   bacterium	   must	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  connection	  of	  spatiotemporal	  states:	  these	  states	  are	  “genidentical.”	  Now,	  if	  a	  bacterium	  divides	   into	   two	  daughter	   bacteria,	  most	   biologists	  will	   say	   that	   this	   division	  marks	   a	  new	  start,	  which	  means	  that	  states	  of	  the	  mother	  bacterium	  and	  states	  of	  the	  daughter	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bacteria	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  “genidentical.”	  The	  statement	  that	  “a	  new	  start”	  occurs,	  which	   is	   the	  key	  statement	  of	   the	  genidentity	  view,	  naturally	  depends	  on	  a	  criterion	  of	  
continuity	  adopted	  by	  the	  observer.	  We	  show	  below	  how	  experimental	  sciences	  can	  help	  us	  define	  these	  criteria	  in	  specific	  contexts.	  	  The	  genidentity	  view	  can	  be	  better	  understood	  by	  its	  opposition	  to	  other	  conceptions	  of	  temporal	   identity.	  First,	   the	  genidentity	  view	   is	  antisubstantialist	  since	   it	   says	   that	   the	  identity	   of	   X	   through	   time	   does	   not	   presuppose	   that	   “something”	   of	   X	   remains.	   (It	   is	  also—perhaps	   even	   more	   explicitly—antiessentialist,	   at	   least	   if	   essentialism	   is	  understood	   as	   the	   claim	   that	   X	   is	   the	   same	   if	   there	   exists	   a	   permanent	   “core”	   or	  “substrate”	  of	  X	  through	  time.)	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  genidentity	  view,	  the	  question	  “What	  is	  X,	  fundamentally?”	   is	   replaced	   by	   the	   question	   “How	   should	   I	   follow	   X	   through	   time?”	  Second,	   the	   genidentity	   view	   is	   also	   in	   opposition	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   identity-­‐resemblance,	  according	   to	  which	   X	   remains	   through	   time	   if	   it	   sufficiently	   resembles	   itself.	   In	   other	  words,	   three	   general	   conceptions	   of	   identity	   through	   time	   are	   schematically	  distinguished	  here:	  1.	  Substantialism:	   the	   identity	  of	  X	   is	  rooted	   in	  the	   idea	  that	  something	  of	  X	  remains	  through	   time	   (and	  essentialism	   is	   therefore	  one	   important	   form	  of	   substantialism,	  though	   not	   the	   only	   one:	   as	   will	   be	   explained	   below,	   Leibniz	   and	   Wiggins,	   for	  instance,	  are	  substantialists	  but	  not	  essentialists).	  	  2.	  Identity-­‐resemblance:	  the	  identity	  of	  X	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  X	  looks	  sufficiently	  like	  itself	  through	  time.	  	  3.	   Genidentity:	   the	   identity	   of	   X	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	   idea	   that	   X	   is	   characterized	   by	  sufficiently	  continuous	  states	  through	  time.	  	  As	  has	  often	  been	  recognized	  (e.g.,	  Boniolo	  and	  Carrara	  2004,	  456	  n.	  1),	  the	  genidentity	  view	  draws	  on	  the	  conception	  of	   identity	  defended	  by	  Locke	  ([1694]	  1975).	  Exploring	  the	   problem	   of	   identity	   through	   time	   of	   a	   given	   entity	   (be	   it	   a	   tree,	   an	   animal,	   or	   a	  human),	  Locke	  considers	   that	   the	  most	  satisfying	  criterion	   for	  diachronic	   identity	   (the	  “principle	  of	  individuation”)	  is	  continuity	  of	  states	  (1975,	  II,	  27,	  §3,	  330).	  Applied	  to	  the	  problem	   of	   the	   identity	   through	   time	   of	   a	   given	  man,	   this	   conception	   leads	   Locke	   to	  assert:	  This	   also	   shows	   wherein	   the	   Identity	   of	   the	   same	   Man	   consists;	   viz.	   in	  nothing	   but	   a	   participation	   of	   the	   same	   continued	   Life,	   by	   constantly	  fleeting	  Particles	  of	  Matter,	  in	  succession	  vitally	  united	  to	  the	  same	  organized	  Body.	   (Locke	  1975,	   §6,	  331)	  Our	   intention	   is	   to	   build	   further	   on	   Locke’s	   suggestion,	   in	   order	   to	   offer	   a	   precise	  definition	  of	   the	  notion	  of	   genidentity,	   applicable	   to	   physics	   and	   biology,	   and	   to	   lay	  the	   foundations	   of	   an	   ontology	   centered	   on	   processes	   and	   change	   rather	   than	  substances,	   invariance,	   and	   laws.	  Famously,	  Leibniz	   	   (in	  particular	   in	  his	  New	  Essays,	  written	  as	  a	  systematic	   response	   to	  Locke),	  disagrees	  with	  Locke	  on	   identity	  viewed	  as	  continuity:	  By	   itself	   continuity	   no	   more	   constitutes	   substance	   than	   does	   multitude	   or	  number.	   …  Something	   is	   necessary	   to	   be	   numbered,	   repeated	   and	  continued.	   (Leibniz	   [1765]	  1916,	  Gerhardt	   II,	   169)	  In	   contemporary	   metaphysical	   debates	   about	   identity,	   David	   Wiggins	   (2001,	   57)	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explicitly	  endorses	  Leibniz’s	  view,	  and	  rejects	  the	  idea	  that	  identity	  could	  be	  defined	  as	  bare	   continuity	   (see	   also	   Wiggins	   1968).	   The	   dispute	   between	   Locke	   and	   Leibniz,	  therefore,	   is	   far	   from	   being	   extinguished.	   Here	   we	   defend	   a	   view	   close	   to	   Locke’s,	   in	  some	   specific	   cases	   taken	   from	   physics	   and	   biology	   (a	   similar	   defense,	   applied	  specifically	  to	  immunology,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Pradeu	  and	  Carosella	  2006).	  	  	  Our	   focus	   in	   this	   chapter	   is	   on	  diachronic,	   not	   synchronic,	   identity:	  we	   are	  not	   asking	  what	  makes	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  physical	  or	  biological	  object	  at	  time	  t—for	  instance	  how	  it	  can	   be	   distinguished	   from	   other	   things,	   what	   its	   physical	   boundaries	   are,	   and	   so	   on.	  Instead,	  we	  are	  asking	  what	  makes	  X	  the	  “same”	  at	  two	  different	  moments	  in	  time.	  This	  will	   naturally	   involve	   questions	   about	   distinguishability,	   boundaries,	   or	   individuality,	  but	   always	   in	   a	   temporal,	   historical	   context.	   In	   other	   words,	   to	   use	   the	   language	   of	  relativity,	  we	  will	  not	  discuss	  why	  a	  particular	  event	   can	  be	  associated	   to	  a	  particular	  individual,	  but	  how	  different	  events	  can	  be	  related	  and	  seen	  as	  characterizing	  the	  same	  individual.1	  	  Though	   the	   intention	   of	   its	   instigators	   was	   to	   make	   a	   useful	   contribution	   to	  experimental	   sciences,	   applications	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   genidentity	   to	  real	   science	  have	  been	   scarce	   and,	   usually,	   unsatisfying.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   we	   try	   to	   take	   up	   Lewin’s	  objective	   by	   demonstrating	   that	   a	   better-­‐defined	   concept	   of	   genidentity	   sheds	   an	  important	  light	  on	  identity	  through	  time	  both	  in	  physics	  and	  in	  biology.	  	  We	  are	  aware	  that	  a	  direct	  comparison	  between	  physics	  and	  biology	  regarding	  the	  way	  they	   conceptualize	   identity	   may	   seem	   surprising.	   Physics	   and	   biology	   both	   raise	  questions	  about	   individuality	   and	   identity	   through	   time,	  but	   they	  do	   so	   in	   a	  markedly	  different	  way.	  These	  differences	  include	  the	  four	  following	  aspects:	  1.	   In	   biology,	   parts-­‐whole	   questions	   seem	   crucial,	   probably	   because	  most,	   if	   not	   all,	  biological	   entities	   appear	   as	   constituted	   of	   smaller	   biological	   entities	   (as,	   for	  example,	   when	   one	   asks	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   cells	   constituting	   a	   multicellular	  organism	  are	   themselves	   “individuals”),	   and	  most	   biological	   entities	   appear	   to	  be	  constituents	   of	   larger	   biological	   entities,	   while	   part-­‐whole	   questions	   play	   a	   less	  important	  role	  in	  physics.2	  	  2.	  In	  physics,	  distinguishing	  one	  particle	  among	  many	  identical	  particles	  is	  a	  key	  issue,	  while	  in	  biology	  even	  individuals	  that	  are	  said	  to	  be	  “identical”	  express,	  most	  of	  the	  time,	   some	   significant	   differences	   and,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   can	   usually	   be	   spatially	  distinguished.	  	  3.	  In	  physics,	  the	  principle	  of	  indiscernibles	  is	  critical	  in	  discussions	  about	  synchronic	  identity,	  but	  not	  in	  biology.	  Biologists	  often	  say	  that	  two	  living	  things	  are	  “identical”	  even	   when	   they	   do	   not	   share	   all	   their	   properties	   (in	   particular	   their	   position	   in	  space),	  as	  with	  clonal	  organisms.	  	  4.	   In	  physics,	  discussions	  over	  structuralism	  are	  extremely	   important,	  as	  one	  crucial	  aim	   is	   to	   determine	   what	   remains	   invariant	   under	   transformations;	   in	   biology,	  structuralism	   plays	   a	   lesser	   role,	   if	   any	   (for	   exceptions	   to	   this	   trend,	   see	   French	  2011,	  French	  and	  Ladyman,	  this	  volume).	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Despite	   these	   important	  differences,	  we	   intend	   to	   show	   in	   this	   chapter	   the	  utility	  of	   a	  comparison	   between	   physics	   and	   biology	   in	   their	   understanding	   of	   identity	   through	  time,	  and	  the	  fruitfulness	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  genidentity	  in	  both	  domains.	  From	  our	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  gain	  is	  more	  significant	  in	  biology	  than	  in	  physics,	  but	  some	  important	  cases	  taken	  from	  physics	  can	  nonetheless	  benefit	  from	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  genidentity	  view.	  In	  other	   words,	   we	   suggest	   that	   the	   genidentity	   view	   is	   useful	   both	   in	   biology	   and	   in	  physics,	   and,	   perhaps	   even	   more	   importantly,	   that	   it	   can	   be	   pivotal	   to	   fostering	   a	  dialogue	   between	   these	   two	   major	   scientific	   fields.	   The	   outline	   of	   the	   chapter	   is	   as	  follows.	  In	  section	  16.2,	  we	  examine	  different	  concepts	  of	  genidentity	  and	  the	  difficulties	  they	   raise.	   In	   sections	   16.3	   and	   16.4,	   we	   explore	   several	   examples,	   respectively	   in	  physics	  and	  in	  biology,	  that	  demonstrate	  the	  utility	  of	  adopting	  the	  genidentity	  view.	  In	  section	  16.5,	  we	  lay	  the	  foundations	  of	  an	  ontology	  of	  processes	  and	  change,	  in	  contrast	  to	  an	  ontology	  of	  substances,	  invariance,	  and	  laws.	  
16.2	  Approaches	  to	  Genidentity	  	  16.2.1	  Lewin’s	  Conception	  of	  Genidentity	  	  The	   term	   “genidentity”	   is	   typically	   regarded	   as	   coined	   by	   Lewin	   in	   1920	   (and	   later	  analyzed	  in	  Lewin	  1922),	  though	  he	  was	  not	  the	  first	  to	  use	  it	  in	  a	  published	  work.	  For	  Lewin,	   the	   concept	   of	   genidentity	   is	   expressed	   in	   mereological	   terms.	   A	   temporally	  extended	  entity	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  entities,	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  genuine	  individual,	   and	   the	   relation	   between	   these	   entities	   is	   genidentity.3	   Since	   the	   kind	   of	  mereology	  involved	  in	  each	  scientific	  discipline	  is	  not	  exactly	  the	  same,	  the	  appropriate	  genidentity	  relation	  is	  therefore	  context	  dependent.	  	  	  Lewin	  defines	  simple	  and	  complete	  genidentity.	  Two	  collections	  of	  temporal	  parts	  (sets	  of	  entities	  at	  two	  distinct	  times)	  are	  simply	  genidentical	  if	  they	  are	  genidentical	  but	  one	  of	  the	  collections	  (let	  us	  say	  the	  earlier	  one)	  could	  also	  be	  said	  to	  be	  simply	  genidentical	  to	  another	  collection	  at	   the	  second	   time.	  The	   two	  collections	  are	  said	   to	  be	  completely	  
genidentical	  if	  that	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  This	  distinction	  will	  not	  play	  any	  role	  in	  this	  chapter	  but	   is	   important	   in	   Lewin’s	   conception	   because	   simple	   and	   complete	   genidentity	  definitions	   are	   related.	   As	   shown	   by	   Smith	   and	   Mulligan	   (1982),	   in	   the	   context	   of	  physics,	   Lewin’s	   definition	   of	   simple	   genidentity	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   complete	  genidentity	   on	   the	   other	   can	   be	   formalized	   as	   shown	   in	   figure	   16.1	   (if	   we	   represent	  complete	  genidentity	  by	  p≡,	  simple	  genidentity	  by	  p=,	  is	  a	  proper	  or	  improper	  part	  of	  by	  ≤	  and,	  is	  discrete	  from	  as	  /).	  	  	  
	  Figure	  16.1	  Formalization	   of	   simple	   and	   complete	   genidentity	   according	   to	   Smith	  and	  Mulligan	   (1982)	  	   We	  may	  illustrate	  this	  definition	  with	  an	  example.	  Let	  us	  imagine	  that	  we	  have	  initially	  a	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piece	   of	   iron	   and	   a	   bucket	   of	   strong	   acid.	   The	   piece	   of	   iron	   falls	   in	   the	   bucket	   and	  dissolves,	  emitting	  heat.	  According	  to	  the	  above	  definition	  (iron	  +	  acid)	  p≡ (acid	  solution	  +	  heat)	  and	  (iron	  +	  acid)	   p=	  (heat).	  The	  mereological	  definitions	  (simple	  and	  complete	  genidentity)	  imply	  that	  after	  the	  action	  of	  the	  acid	  on	  the	  iron	  piece,	  the	  iron	  is	  still	  in	  the	  solution	  in	  a	  certain	  form.	  And	  before	  this	  action	  the	  heat	  was	  in	  a	  certain	  form	  present.	  All	   this	   is	  of	  course	  true:	   the	   iron	   is	  still	  present	  as	  atoms	   in	  the	  solution	  and	  the	  heat	  was	  present	  in	  the	  initial	  state	  as	  chemical	  binding	  energy.	  But	  obviously	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  “to	  be	  present”	  is	  very	  different	  in	  each	  case.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  disadvantage	  of	  any	  mereological	   definition	   of	   genidentity.	   In	   this	   approach,	   if	   two	   states	   are	   genidentical,	  they	  must	  be	  conceived	  as	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  same	  temporally	  extended	  entity.	  This	  assertion	  does	  not	  shed	  any	  light	  on	  the	  relation	  that	  makes	  these	  two	  states	  of	  the	  same	  thing.	  Moreover,	  we	  could	  argue	  that	  once	  we	  have	  individuated	  a	  temporally	  extended	  entity	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  its	  temporal	  parts,	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  give	  a	  precise	  definition	  of	   this	   relation	  since	  we	  already	  possess	  a	  diachronic	   identity	   criterion.	   In	   conclusion,	  Lewin’s	   definition	   of	   genidentity	   presupposes	   that	   we	   already	   have	   a	   method	   to	  individuate	   individuals	   through	   time,	  which	   is	   highly	  problematic.	   In	   Lewin’s	   account,	  genidentity	   is	   a	   primitive	   notion.	   Overall,	   therefore,	   this	   approach	   does	   not	   seem	  appropriate	  to	  develop	  an	  operative	  concept	  of	  genidentity	  that	  could	  be	  used	  in	  physics	  and	  biology.	  	  16.2.2	  Reichenbach’s	  Conception	  of	  Genidentity	  	  Reichenbach	   ([1956]	   1971)	   offered	   his	   own	   conception	   of	   genidentity.	   It	   is	   this	  conception	  that	  will	  be	  applied	  here	  to	  biology	  and	  physics.	  (We	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  later	  work	   of	   Reichenbach	   on	   genidentity;	   on	   his	   earlier	   conception,	   see	   Padovani	   2013.)	  Reichenbach	  distinguishes	  genidentity,	  which	  is	  applied	  to	  physical	  entities,	  from	  logical	  identity:	  The	  physical	  identity	  of	  a	   thing,	  also	  called	  genidentity,	  must	  be	  distinguished	  from	  logical	   identity.	  An	  event	  is	   logically	   identical	  to	  itself;	  but	  when	  we	  say	  that	   different	   events	   are	   states	   of	   the	   same	   thing,	   we	   employ	   a	   relation	   of	  genidentity	  holding	  between	  these	  events.	  A	  physical	   thing	   is	  thus	  a	  series	  of	  events;	  any	  two	  events	  belonging	  to	  this	  series	  are	  genidentical.	  (Reichenbach	  [1956]	  1971,	  38)	  In	   this	   quote,	   Reichenbach	   points	   exactly	   to	   the	  main	   difficulty	   inherent	   to	  the	  notion	  of	   genidentity.	   As	   Quine	   (1966,	   145)	   later	   argued,	   the	   diachronic	   identity	   of	   a	   thing	  cannot	   be	   captured	   by	   logical	   identity	   alone,	   since	   such	   identity	   is	   indexed	   by	   space-­‐time	   locations;	   therefore,	   something	   else	   must	   be	   provided.4	   	   	  Reichenbach	   believes	  that	   “speaking	  of	   things	   and	   speaking	  of	   events	   represent	   merely	   different	   modes	   of	  speech”	   ([1956]	   1971,	   224),	   and	   he	   proposes	   to	   define	   the	   diachronic	   identity	   of	   a	  thing	   as	   a	   relation	  among	  events.	   At	  a	   minimum,	  two	  	  genidentical	  	  events	  	  should	  	  be	  	  related	   by	   a	   “worldline”	   	   that	   lies	   in	   the	   light	   cone	   of	   the	   earliest	   event	   (in	   other	  words,	   two	   events	   cannot	   be	   genidentical	   	   if	   they	   can	   be	   related	   only	   by	   a	   signal	  going	   	   faster	   than	   the	   speed	   	  of	   light).	   	  Being	   related	  by	   a	   worldline	   is	   necessary	   for	  genidentity,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   sufficient,	   since	   there	   is	   a	   certain	  degree	  of	   arbitrariness	   in	  how	   we	   define	   worldlines	   for	   successive	   events	   (it	   is	   especially	   true	   in	   the	   case	   of	  fields,	   for	   which	  the	   direction	  of	   the	  striation	   is	  arbitrary).	  This	  arbitrariness	   is	  one	  of	  the	   reasons	   that	   convinced	  Einstein	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   substance	  was	   inadequate	   for	  modern	  physics	   (Reichenbach	  1958,	   270–271).	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  In	  addition	  to	  being	  related	  by	  a	  worldline,	  then,	  two	  genidentical	  events	  must	  be	  related	  by	  a	  causal	  relation.5	  But	  not	  any	  causal	  relation	  will	  do	  the	  trick.	  Only	  causal	  chains	  that	  could	   be	   said	   to	   relate	   events	   characterizing	   states	   of	   the	   same	   thing	   should	   be	  considered.	  Since	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  way	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  same	  thing	  through	  time,	  Reichenbach	   argues	   that	   there	   will	   be	   more	   than	   one	   way	   to	   define	   a	   genuine	  genidentical	  relation.	  That	  genidentity	  could	  be	  defined	  in	  multiple	  ways	  and,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  individual	   is	  relative	  to	  a	  certain	  theoretical	  point	  of	  view	  should	  not	   be	   surprising.	   In	  Reichenbach’s	   (and,	   even	  more,	   in	   our)	   approach	   to	   the	   relation	  between	   metaphysics	   and	   science,	   metaphysical	   concepts,	   such	   as,	   for	   example,	   the	  concept	  of	  an	  individual,	  help	  us	  organize	  the	  scientific	  discourse,	  but	  they	  are	  certainly	  
not	  a	   foundation	  to	   it.	   Except	   in	   cases	  where	   “individual”	   is	   a	   theoretical	   term	  defined	  explicitly	   in	  a	   theory,	   the	  concept	  of	  an	   individual	  could	  be	  abstracted	  or	  projected	  on	  the	   scientific	   discourse.	   It	   does	   not	   bind	   it,	   nor	   are	   we	   forced	   to	   include	   it	   in	   our	  ontology.	  However,	  ontological	  commitment	  can	  act	  as	  a	  constraint.	  Indeed,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that,	  in	  Reichenbach’s	  work	  at	  least,	  the	  concepts	  of	  genidentity	  and	  causality	  are	  closely	   connected,	   to	   the	   point	   that	   the	   latter	   cannot	   be	   defined	   without	   the	   former.	  When	   Reichenbach	   discusses	   the	   constraints	   on	   a	   causal	   chain	   signal	   in	   special	  relativity,	  he	  conveys	  the	  idea	  that	  something	  is	  propagating	  through	  space	  and	  time.	  In	  consequence,	  a	  principle,	  namely	  genidentity,	   is	  required	  to	   individuate	  this	  something	  through	  space-­‐time,	  in	  order	  to	  discuss	  the	  causal	  relation	  involved.	  	  	  The	   closest	  way	   to	   define	   a	   genidentity	   relation	   that	   could	   reflect	   how	  we	   talk	   about	  ideal	   macroscopic	   objects,	   like	   billiard	   balls	   (if	   these	   objects	   were	   unaltered	   by	   any	  interaction),	   is	  what	  Reichenbach	  called	  material	  genidentity.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  definition	  is	   to	   get	   to	   the	  diachronic	   identity	  of	   beings	   evolving	   temporally.	  This	   relation	   can	  be	  defined	  by	  three	  characteristics:	  (1)	  continuity	  of	  change,	  (2)	  spatial	  exclusion,	  and	  (3)	  distinguishability	   of	   states	   that	   differ	   only	   in	   the	   permutation	   of	   two	   objects	   ([1956]	  1971,	  225).	  The	  first	  characteristic	  expresses	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  must	  be	  able	  to	  follow	  the	  evolution	  of	   the	   individual	   through	  space	  and	  time.	  Continuity	  of	  change	   is	   the	  easiest	  way	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal,	  but	  this	  condition	  could	  be	  relaxed	  in	  certain	  cases.	  The	  second	  characteristic	  specifies	  that	  different	  individuals	  cannot	  occupy	  the	  same	  position	  simul-­‐taneously.	   This	   guarantees	   that	   an	   interaction	   between	   individuals	  will	   not	  make	   the	  identity	  ambiguous.	  The	  last	  characteristic	   is	   less	  intuitive	  but	  is	   justified,	  we	  think,	  by	  the	  need	   to	   avoid	   the	   identity	   ambiguity	  when	   the	  determination	  of	  which	   events	   are	  simultaneous	  could	  differ	  depending	  on	  the	  chosen	  reference	  frame.	  Of	  course,	  if	  no	  two	  individuals	  share	  all	  the	  same	  properties,	  they	  cannot	  be	  wrongly	  identified.	  This	  is	  not	  in	  general	  the	  case	  in	  physics.6	  These	  characteristics	  are	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  to	  guarantee	   individuality,	   since,	   as	   Reichenbach	   admits,	   there	   are	   obvious	  counterexamples	  ([1956]	  1971,	  225).	  	  In	  practice,	   it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  find	  any	  useful	  application	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  material	  genidentity	  in	  current	  physics.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  can	  work	  as	  an	  idealized	  (paradigmatic)	  case,	   illustrating	   the	   necessary	   conditions	   for	   a	   more	   complex	   and	   more	   useful	  conception	  of	  genidentity.	  In	  this	  second	  conception,	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  evolution	  through	   space	   and	   time	   of	   a	   unique	   individual	   potentially	   interacting	   with	   other	  
individuals	  at	  a	  distance.	  To	  capture	  such	  a	  process,	  Reichenbach	  proposes	  the	  concept	  of	   functional	  genidentity,	  which	   refers	   to	   the	   retention	  of	   the	   same	   “function”	   through	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time,	  without	  retention	  of	  matter.	  For	  instance,	  if	  we	  claim	  that	  an	  organism	  is	  still	  the	  “same”	  after	  absorbing	  some	  nutriments,	  we	  are	  considering	  the	  identity	  through	  time	  of	  an	  individual	  that	   interacts	  with	  other	   individual	  entities,	  and,	  this	   is	  not	  something	  that	  material	  genidentity	  can	  explain	  (because	  material	  genidentity	  presupposes	  spatial	  exclusion)	   (Reichenbach	   [1956]	   1971,	   227);	   we	   need	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	  “functional”	   identity	   of	   this	   organism,	   and	   not	   its	   “material”	   identity.	   Reichenbach	  remains	   imprecise	   about	   “functional	   genidentity,”	   but	   he	   does	   give	   a	   nice	   example:	  transversal	   water	   waves.	   In	   a	   transversal	   wave,	   water	   moves	   only	   vertically.	   The	  continuity	   of	   change	   does	   not	   involve	   transportation	   of	   matter.	   However,	   there	   is	   a	  continuous	   momentum	   and	   energy	   propagation	   perpendicular	   to	   this	   vertical	   move.	  Spatial	  exclusion	  is	  violated,	  since	  waves	  can	  superpose	  and	  there	  could	  be	  permutation	  symmetry	   since	   a	  wave	   can	   be	   identical	   to	   another	   if	   they	   share	   the	   same	   dynamical	  properties.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  many	  circumstances,	  you	  can	  track	  a	  wave	  in	  space-­‐time	  by	  defining	  a	  function	  of	  the	  wave	  parameters	  that	  evolves	  continuously.	  	  	  Which	   function	   should	   be	   used	   to	   track	   the	   “real”	   individuals	   is	   not	   an	   appropriate	  question	  in	  this	  context.	  Of	  course,	  as	  a	  minimal	  requirement,	  the	  function	  should	  denote	  a	   causal	   process.	   But	   among	   all	   possible	   causal	   processes,	   which	   one	   should	   be	  understood	  as	  relating	  states	  of	  the	  same	  thing	  is	  a	  question	  without	  a	  general	  answer.	  Someone	  could	  claim	  that	  the	  wave	  equation	  describes	  the	  collective	  behavior	  of	  water	  molecules,	   the	   legitimate	   individuals	   or,	   even	   further,	   that	   the	   wave	   is	   denoting	   the	  change	  in	  space-­‐time	  points’	  properties,	  which	  would	  be	  the	  “real”	  individuals.	  Since	  the	  connection	  between	  a	  scientific	  theory	  and	  its	  ontology	  is	  not	  straightforward,	  all	  these	  positions	  can	  be	  argued	  (Braillard	  et	  al.	  2011).	  In	  section	  16.3,	  we	  return	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	   the	   existence	  of	   a	  particular	   function	   is	   enough	   to	   claim	   that	   a	  wave	   is	   an	  individual.	  	  	  Overall,	   Reichenbach	   has	   made	   an	   important	   contribution	   to	   the	   definition	   of	  genidentity	  by	  making	  several	  key	  distinctions:	  1.	  Genidentity	  is	  about	  physical	  identity,	  which	  implies	  more	  than	  just	  logical	  identity.	  	  2.	   Genidentity	   corresponds	   not	   to	   any	   physical	   identity	   (defined	   as	   a	   worldline	   of	  continuous	  states),	  but	  to	  causal	  physical	  identity	  (defined	  as	  a	  worldline	  of	  causally	  
connected	  continuous	  states).	  	  3.	  Genidentity	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  material	  genidentity	  (defined	  as	  retention	  of	  matter,	  distinguishability,	  and	  spatial	  exclusion	  with	  regard	  to	  other	  entities)	  and	  functional	  genidentity	   (defined	   as	   retention	   of	   the	   same	   “function”	   through	   time,	   without	  retention	  of	  matter).	  	  After	   Reichenbach,	   very	   few	   scientists	   and	   philosophers	   have	   used	   the	   notion	   of	  genidentity.	   (There	   are	   some	   exceptions,	   including	   Boniolo	   and	   Carrara	   2004,	   but	  because	  of	  space	  limitation	  we	  will	  not	  discuss	  them	  here.)	  	  
16.3	  Genidentity	  in	  Physics	  	  In	  this	  section,	  we	  show	  how	  the	  notion	  of	  genidentity	  can	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  individuation	   in	   classical	   physics.	   Importantly,	   we	   will	   not	   adopt	   here	   a	   normative	  approach	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   an	   individual.	   In	   particular,	   we	   will	   not	   claim	   that	   only	  something	   like	  material	  genidentity	   (defined	   as	   retention	   of	  matter,	   distinguishability,	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and	   spatial	   exclusion	   with	   regard	   to	   other	   entities)	   captures	   the	   real	   concept	   of	   an	  individual	   (see	  Table	  16,1),	  although	   it	   is	  undeniable	   that	   this	   relation	   is	  very	  close	   to	  the	  concept	  we	  use	   in	  ordinary	   life	  when	   talking	  about	   the	   identity	  of	  material	   things.	  Instead,	  we	  will	  start	  with	  material	  genidentity,	  and	  then	  relax	  its	  requirements	  in	  order	  to	   generate	   a	  more	   applicable	   concept	   of	   genidentity,	   namely	   a	   functional	  one.	  Armed	  with	   this	   functional	   genidentity	   relation,	   we	  will,	   in	   section	   16.4,	   apply	   it	   to	   a	  much-­‐debated	  problem,	  the	  problem	  of	  biological	  individuality.	  	  Table	  16.1	  Necessary	  Conditions	  for	  Material	  Genidentity	  
	  This	  move	  from	  material	  genidentity	  toward	  functional	  genidentity	  will	  be	  structured	  by	  three	  paradigmatic	  cases	  of	  growing	  complexity,	  each	  step	  building	  on	  the	  previous	  one:	  (1)	   the	   free	   individual	   (the	   form	   of	   functional	   genidentity	   that	   is	   closest	   to	   material	  genidentity),	   (2)	   the	   changing	   individual	   without	   interaction,	   and	   finally	   (3)	   the	   fully	  interacting	   individual	   (see	   table	   16.2).	   Once	   the	   three	   types	   are	   described,	   we	   can	  combine	  them	  to	  represent	  complex	  situations.	  All	  these	  cases	  will	  be	  illustrated	  in	  wave	  theory.	   The	   choice	   of	   wave	   theory	   is	   not	   insignificant.	   Contrary	   to	   particle	   physics,	  undulatory	  mechanics	  has	  traditionally	  been	  hostile	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  individual.	  So	  offering	  a	  definition	  of	  an	  individual	  in	  this	  context	  would	  demonstrate	  the	  fruitfulness	  of	  our	  approach.	  Though	  philosophers	  of	  physics	  have	  very	  rarely	  paid	  attention	  to	  this	  aspect	  of	  wave	  theory	  and	  to	  the	  case	  of	  solitons	  in	  particular,	  our	  conviction	  is	  that	  this	  is	   a	   pivotal	   domain	   to	   understand	   the	   notion	   of	   genidentity	   and,	   more	   generally,	   to	  reflect	   on	   identity	   in	   classical	   physics.	   It	   is	  worth	  mentioning	   that,	   since	   the	   standard	  procedure	   to	   get	   to	   a	   quantum	   theory	   is	   to	   start	   from	   a	   classical	   theory,	   even	   if	   the	  ontology	  of	  a	  particular	  quantum	  theory	  could	  be	  different	  from	  its	  associated	  classical	  theory,	  it	  is	  never	  totally	  independent	  from	  it.	  	  Table	  16.2	  Paradigmatic	  Cases	  of	  Functional	  Individuals	  
Free functional individuals Relaxed characteristics 2 and 
3 of material individuals 
Ex.: free solitons 
Changing functional 
individuals 
Constant or continuously 
changing rate of the function 
defining free individuals 
Ex.: dissipating waves 
Interacting functional 
individuals 
Changing/free individuals + 
interaction events (with or 
without loss of identity) 
Ex.: interacting solitons 
	  Let	   us	   start	  with	   the	   first	   case,	   the	   free	   individual.	   A	   perfect	   billiard	   ball	  moving	   in	   a	  straight	  line	  in	  vacuum	  is	  a	  model	  of	  a	  free	  individual	  for	  which	  the	  states	  are	  materially	  
genidentical.	   If	   we	   relax	   the	   second	   characteristic	   (spatial	   exclusion)	   of	   material	  genidentity,	  a	  soliton,	  that	  is,	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐reinforcing	  solitary	  wave,	  becomes	  as	  well	  a	  model	  close	  to	  material	  genidentity	  (Drazin	  and	  Johnson	  1989).	  A	  soliton	  is	  a	  localized	  traveling	  wave	   in	  nonlinear	   systems.	   It	   does	  not	  obey	   the	   superposition	  principle	   and	  does	   not	   dissipate.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   a	   soliton,	   no	   matter	   is	   globally	   transported.	   As	  Reichenbach	  had	  emphasized	   for	  wave	   theory,	   the	  diachronic	   identity	  of	   a	   soliton	   can	  
 Material Genidentity  
1) Continuity of change 2) Spatial exclusion 3) Distinguishability 
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only	  be	  represented	  by	  functional	  genidentity.	  For	  example,	  the	  solution	  of	  the	  nonlinear	  partial	  differential	  equations	  could	  serve	  as	  the	  identity	  function	  since	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  wave	  is	  unchanging	  and	  the	  movement	  is	  continuous.	  Other	  functions	  of	  the	  topology	  or	  conservation	  principles	  could	  also	  be	  used.	  Our	  claim	  here	  is	  that	  a	  soliton	  is	  functionally	  as	  close	  as	  one	  could	  get	  to	  a	  substantial	  individual	  for	  which	  we	  would	  have	  a	  material	  genidentity	   relation	   enabling	   us	   to	   follow	   its	   states.	   Trivially,	   a	   solitary	   soliton	   is	  absolutely	  discernible	  and	  it	  can	  be	  continuously	  followed.	  For	  us,	  it	  is	  the	  paradigmatic	  case	   of	   a	   functional	   individual.	   As	   to	   the	   question	   “Is	   this	   particular	   soliton	   solution	  representing	   a	   physical	   individual	   or	   not?,”	   it	   does	   not	   have	   a	   general	   answer.	   All	  depends	  on	  how	  this	  particular	  piece	  of	  mathematics	  is	  used	  in	  the	  physical	  model.	  It	  is	  the	  physical	  model	  that	  defines	  what	  kinds	  of	  functions	  are	  ontologically	  significant	  for	  diachronic	   identity.	   It	   is	  worth	  mentioning	   that	   solitons	  are	  considered	  as	  particles	  or	  more	   precisely	   quasi-­‐particles	   in	   many	   quantum	   field	   models.	   These	   particles	   are	  different	   from	   the	   so-­‐called	   elementary	   particles	   since	   they	   do	   not	   arise	   from	   the	  quantization	  of	  the	  wavelike	  excitations	  of	  the	  fields	  and	  possess	  a	  topological	  structure	  (Mantan	  and	  Sutcliffe	  2004).	  	  	  Let	   us	   now	   return	   to	   the	   case	   of	   the	   billiard	   ball	   in	   a	   vacuum,	   and	   relax	   the	   third	  characteristic	   (distinguishability	   under	   permutation)	   in	   order	   to	   allow	   other	   free	  identical	   billiard	   balls	   moving	   around	   without	   interacting	   one	   with	   the	   other.	   The	  equivalent	  model	  would	  be	  many	  identically	  shaped	  solitons	  that	  travel	  without	  meeting	  or	  interacting	  one	  with	  the	  other.	  In	  this	  case,	  our	  entities	  are	  not	  absolutely	  discernible	  anymore	   but	   are	   at	   best	   weakly	   discernible	   (for	   definitions,	   see	   Saunders’s	   and	  Ladyman’s	   chapters	   in	   this	   volume).	   Should	  we	   in	   this	   context	   renounce	   calling	   them	  “individuals”?	   We	   do	   not	   think	   so.	   Only	   if	   a	   change	   of	   reference	   frames	   implies	   an	  identity	   ambiguity	   among	   them	  should	  we	   renounce	   talk	   about	   “individuals.”	   In	  many	  cases,	   the	   loss	   of	   absolute	   discernibility	   does	   not	   preclude	   the	   definition	   of	   a	   robust	  genidentity	  relation,	  since	  each	  soliton	  could	  be	  followed	  precisely	  in	  space-­‐time.	  	   Let	   us	   now	  discuss	   the	   second	   case:	   the	   continuously	   changing	   individual.	  Here	  we	  have	  in	  mind	  cases	  where	  an	  individual	  is	  apparently	  changing	  during	  its	  movement	  in	  space-­‐time,	   for	   example,	   a	   billiard	   ball	   continuously	   changing	   color,	   or,	   in	   undulatory	  theory,	  a	  continuously	  changing	  solitary	  wave.	  The	  first	  case,	  the	  free	  individual,	  gives	  a	  baseline	  with	  which	  to	  understand	  this	  new	  case.	  We	  have	  a	  function	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  follow	   the	   individual	   through	   its	   continuous	   evolution,	   typically	   with	   one	   or	   many	  conserved	  quantities.	  Now	  we	  allow	  this	  function	  to	  fluctuate.	  We	  measure	  its	  derivative	  to	  quantify	  this	  change.	  Under	  which	  rate	  of	  change	  we	  should	  still	  consider	  the	  related	  events	  as	   characterizing	   the	  same	  individual	   is	   a	   contextual	  question.	  Note	   that	  we	  do	  not	   ask	   how	  much	   color	   change,	   or	   topology	   change,	   is	   enough	   to	   talk	   of	   a	   new	   indi-­‐vidual,	  but	  how	  intense,	  or	  discontinuous,	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  must	  be	  to	  assert	  we	  face	  a	  new	   individual	   or	   no	   individual	   at	   all.	   The	   question	   of	   color	   or	   topology	   change	  presumes	  that	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  billiard	  ball	  is	  essentially	  defined	  by	  the	  possession	  of	  some	   properties.	   The	   second	   and	   third	   questions,	   in	   contrast,	   are	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	  genidentity	  conception	  of	  the	   individual.	  No	  properties	  or	  structure	  define	  the	   identity	  of	  the	  billiard	  ball	  or	  of	  the	  wave	  beyond	  the	  causal	  process	  followed	  by	  the	  genidentity	  relation.	  Please	   take	  note	   that	   in	   this	  case,	   the	  source	  of	   the	  change	  (color,	   shape…)	   is	  not	   on	   the	   same	   ontological	   level	   as	   the	   studied	   individual.	   The	   source	   of	   change	   is	  considered	  diffused	   in	   the	  environment.	  There	   is	  no	  clear	  vertex	  with	  the	  worldline	  of	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another	  individual.	  This	  is	  the	  main	  difference	  with	  the	  next	  and	  final	  case.	  	  	  Our	  final	  case	  is	  the	  fully	  interacting	  individual.	  In	  the	  genidentity	  approach,	  this	  case	  is	  the	  really	  challenging	  one,	  since	  no	  change	  of	  essential	  properties	  can	  inform	  us	  when	  an	  interaction	  destroys	  or	   creates	  an	   individual.	  Only	  a	   careful	   study	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  interaction	   itself	   can	   provide	   elements	   for	   discussing	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   individuals	  involved.	  To	  illustrate	  this	  point,	  let	  us	  look	  at	  the	  interaction	  between	  a	  green	  and	  a	  red	  billiard	   ball.	   In	   the	   initial	   state,	  we	  have	   two	  balls	   coming	   toward	   each	   other.	   For	   the	  sake	  of	   the	  discussion,	   let	  us	  suppose	   that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  access	   to	   the	  details	  of	   this	  particular	   interaction.	   In	   the	   last	   stage,	  we	   see	   a	   green	   ball	   and	   a	   red	   ball	   apparently	  identical	  to	  the	  incident	  balls	  going	  away	  from	  each	  other	  with	  a	  certain	  angle	  compared	  to	   the	   initial	   trajectories.	   What	   can	   we	   say	   about	   the	   conserved	   identity	   of	   the	  individuals	  involved?	  If	  the	  interaction	  is	  a	  simple	  repulsion,	  it	  seems	  probable	  that	  the	  final	  green	  ball	   is	  genidentical	  to	  the	  initial	  green	  ball,	  and	  the	  same	  would	  be	  true	  for	  the	   red	   one.	   However,	   if	   the	   repulsion	   is	   accompanied	   by	   an	   exchange	   of	   color,	   our	  answer	   would	   be	   different.	   The	   nature	   of	   the	   interaction	   is	   what	   guides	   us	   in	   our	  assessment	  of	  the	  billiard	  balls’	  identity.	  Of	  course,	  if	  the	  genidentity	  of	  billiard	  balls	  is	  of	  the	  material	  kind,	  then	  each	  individual	  is	  uniquely	  associated	  to	  a	  nonintersecting	  space-­‐time	   trajectory;	   therefore	   we	   simply	   have	   to	   follow	   their	   trajectories	   during	   the	  interaction	   to	  be	   able	   to	  know	  which	   is	  which.	  But	   in	   a	   case	  of	   functional	  genidentity,	  where	  spatial	  exclusion	  is	  not	  a	  given,	  the	  study	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  interaction	  cannot	  be	  put	  aside.	  	  	  This	   last	   case	   is	   precisely	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   study	   of	   soliton	   interactions.	   Contrary	   to	  linear	  waves,	  which	  do	  not	  interact	  when	  they	  are	  superposed,	  the	  nonlinear	  nature	  of	  solitons	   implies	   complex	   interactions.	   Only	   a	   systematic	   study	   of	   these	   interactions	  allows	  us	  to	  say	  something	  about	  the	  genidentity	  of	  interacting	  solitons.	  For	  example,	  let	  us	   take	   the	   class	   of	   one-­‐dimension	   line	   solitons	   involved	   in	   a	   nonresonant	   elastic	  interaction.	   In	   these	  situations,	   the	  number	  of	  solitons	   is	  conserved,	  except	  during	   the	  interaction	  phase.	   All	   soliton	  properties	   are	   completely	   restored	   after	   interaction.	   For	  example,	   the	   direction	   of	   propagation	   and	   the	   linear	   momentum	   seem	   unchanged.	  Important	   amplitude	   change	   can	   occur	   during	   the	   interaction.	   For	   example,	   in	   many	  cases	   the	   total	   amplitude	   of	   the	   superposed	   solitons	   is	   less	   than	   the	   sum	   of	   each	  individual	   amplitude,	   but	   each	   amplitude	   is	   restored	   after	   the	   interaction	   (see	   figure	  16.2).	  The	   interaction	  often	  generates	  a	  phase	   shift,	   a	   change	  of	  position	   compared	   to	  what	  would	   be	   the	   position	   of	   the	   solitons	   if	   the	   interaction	   did	   not	   occur	   (for	  more	  details,	  see	  Soomere	  2011).	  Depending	  on	  the	  particular	  type	  of	   functional	  genidentity	  that	   is	   discussed,	   these	   characteristics	   of	   the	   interaction	   will	   or	   will	   not	   allow	   us	   to	  assert	  that	  the	  solitons	  emerging	  from	  the	  interaction	  are	  the	  same	  as	  the	  ones	  entering	  into	  it.	  More	  precisely,	  the	  question	  that	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  is	  in	  what	  way	  the	  interaction	  
perturbs	  the	  genidentity	  established	  in	  the	  second	  paradigmatic	  case.	  In	  these	  examples,	  even	   if	   the	   interaction	   is	  complex,	   it	  seems	  that	   the	  worldline	  of	  a	  particular	  soliton	   is	  almost	  not	  perturbed	  except	  for	  a	  phase	  shift.	  It	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  argue	  that,	  for	  most	  functional	  genidentity	  relations,	  the	  initial	  individuals	  are	  the	  ones	  appearing	  in	  the	  final	  state.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  possible	  case.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  resonant	  interaction,	  the	  fusion	  of	  two	  or	  more	  solitons	  in	  a	  new	  soliton	  is	  possible.	  The	  time	  reverse	  process,	  fission,	  is	  also	  possible.	  Obviously,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  initial	  solitons	  do	  not	  survive.	  Some	  cases	  are	  more	  ambiguous	  and	  therefore	  difficult	  to	  decide.	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  Figure	  16.2	  Temporal	  evolution	  of	  Korteweg–de	  Vries	  solitons	  described	  by	  the	  two-­‐soliton	  solution	  u(x,	  
t)	  =	  12	  *	  (3	  +	  4	  cosh(2x	  −	  8t)	  +	  cosh(4x	  −	  64t))/	  ([3	  cosh(x	  −	  28t)	  +	  cosh(3x	  −	  36t)]2)	  (Soomere	  2011,	  1583).	  Note	  the	  nonadditivity	  of	  amplitudes	  during	  interaction	  	  With	  kind	  permission	  from	  Springer	  Science	  and	  Business	  Media.	  	  This	   point	   can	   be	   illustrated	   by	   an	   example,	   that	   of	   head-­‐on	   collisions	   of	   two	   baby	  skyrmions	  (BS).	  Baby	  skyrmions	  are	  topological	  solitons,	  in	  a	  (2	  +	  1)-­‐dimensional	  field	  theory,	  which	   are	   closely	   related	   to	   the	   Skyrme	  model.	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   a	   skyrmion	   is	   a	  soliton	   solution	   to	   the	   Skyrme	  model;	   this	   field	  model	   is	  used,	   among	  other	   things,	   to	  represent	  states	  of	  baryons	  and	  excited	  baryons:	  see	  (Skyrme	  1962).	  If	  the	  parameters	  are	  chosen	  to	  allow	  a	  head-­‐on	  collision,	  at	  the	  apex	  of	  the	  interaction	  the	  two	  initial	  baby	  skyrmions	  merge	  to	  form	  a	  ring-­‐like	  structure.	  Just	  after	  this,	  two	  new	  baby	  skyrmions	  emerge,	   for	  almost	  all	   initial	  parameters,	  at	  90°	   from	  the	  original	   incident	   trajectories.	  During	   all	   the	   interaction	   process,	   radiation	   is	   emitted	   (for	   more	   details,	   see	   Piette,	  Schroers,	  and	  Zakrewski	  1995).	  Even	  if	  the	  initial	  BSs	  are	  not	  identical	  and	  the	  final	  two	  BSs	  are	  also	  not	  identical	  in	  a	  similar	  way,	  the	  symmetry	  of	  the	  interaction	  seems	  to	  limit	  our	  capacity	  to	  argue	  either	  way	  about	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  initial	  BSs.	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  interaction	  is	  a	  strong	  limitation	  on	  the	  kind	  of	   functional	  genidentity	  relation	  that	  we	   could	   reasonably	   use.	   This	   contextuality	   of	   identity	   may	   seem	   problematic.	   If	   we	  could	  accept	   it	   for	  quasi-­‐particles	  and	  biological	  beings,	  surely	  the	   identity	  criterion	  of	  fundamental	   particles	   should	   not	   be	   contextually	   defined?	   This	   worry	   presumes	   that	  there	   is	   such	  a	   thing	  as	  a	   fundamental	   theory	  describing	   fundamental	   entities.	   If,	   as	   it	  seems	  currently	  probable,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  a	  fundamental	  theory	  but	  only	  effective	  ones	  (see	  note	  2),	  contextuality	   is	  unavoidable.	  This	  conclusion	  does	  not	  necessarily	   lead	  to	  arbitrary	   identities	   or	   pseudoidentities.	   It	   suggests	   that	   identity	   is	   relative	   to	   a	  theoretical	   context,	   for	   example,	   to	   a	   certain	   range	   of	   physical	   parameters	   shared	   by	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most	  theories,	  like	  energy.	  	  	  Thus,	  in	  this	  section	  we	  argued	  for	  three	  points:	  	  1.	  It	  is	  possible	  in	  a	  field	  theory	  to	  define	  a	  strong	  notion	  of	  genidentity,	  at	  least	  when	  worldlines	  can	  reasonably	  be	  defined.	  Conservation	  of	  matter	  is	  not	  necessary.	  	  2.	   It	   is	   possible	   to	   define	   relaxed	   genidentity	   relations	   that	   could	   accommodate	  changing	  individuals.	  	  3.	  Conservation	  of	  genidentity	   in	   interacting	  situations	  depends	  on	  the	  details	  of	  the	  interaction.	   More	   precisely,	   conservation	   of	   genidentity	   depends	   on	   how	   this	  interaction	  modifies	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  of	  the	  individuating	  function.	  	  Overall,	   this	   section	   has	   shown	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   genidentity	   suggested	   here	   can	   be	  applied	   to	   some	   interesting	  physical	   cases,	   and	   that	   the	  confrontation	  with	  such	  cases	  can	  in	  turn	  help	  us	  to	  refine	  our	  notion	  of	  genidentity,	  and	  to	  better	  determine	  its	  scope.	  In	   the	   next	   section,	   we	   examine	  whether	   the	   notion	   of	   genidentity	   can	   be	   applied	   to	  biological	  cases,	  and	  we	  use	  what	  has	  been	  shown	  here	  about	  physical	  cases	  to	  shed	  a	  new	  light	  on	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  biological	  entities	  through	  time.	  	  
16.4	  Genidentity	  in	  Biology	  	  The	  previous	  section	  has	  presented	  several	  applications	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  genidentity	  to	  physical	  cases.	  We	  would	  now	  like	  to	  show	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  genidentity	  can	  also	  be	  applied	   to	   some	  biological	   cases	   or,	  more	   exactly,	   that	   it	   is	   the	   concept	   best	   suited	   to	  understand	  identity	  through	  time	  in	  biology.	  	  	  Though	   questions	   pertaining	   to	   synchronic	   identity	   are	   important	   in	   biology,	   those	  pertaining	   to	   diachronic	   identity	   have	   long	   been	   recognized	   as	   central	   (Sober	   2000,	  154),	   in	   particular,	   at	   different	   temporal	   scales,	   in	   developmental	   biology	   and	  evolutionary	  biology.	  How	  do	  organisms	  and	  species	   remain	   the	   “same”	   through	   time,	  even	  though	  they	  change	  constantly?	  How	  do	  they	  “start”	  and	  “end”	  their	  lives?	  How	  can	  we	  know	   that	  we	  are	   talking	  about	   the	   “same”	  organism	  or	   the	   “same”	   species	  at	   two	  different	  moments	   in	   time,	   in	   particular	   if	  massive	   changes	   occur	   between	   these	   two	  moments?	  	  	  Certainly	   more	   than	   any	   other	   philosopher	   of	   biology,	   David	   Hull	   (1935–2010)	   has	  recognized	  the	  crucial	  importance	  of	  the	  question	  of	  diachronic	  identity	  in	  biology.	  Even	  more	  strikingly,	  Hull	  explicitly	  defended	  the	  concept	  of	  genidentity	  in	  several	  texts.	  For	  Hull,	   a	   fundamental	   characteristic	   of	   living	   things	   is	   that	   they	   can	   undergo	   massive	  changes	  and	  nonetheless	  maintain	  their	  “identity.”	   It	   is	  precisely	  this	   idea,	  Hull	  claims,	  that	  only	  the	  concept	  of	  genidentity	  can	  properly	  capture:	  	  Three	   traditional	  criteria	   for	   individuality	   in	  material	  bodies	  are	  retention	  of	  substance,	   retention	   of	   structure,	   and	   continuous	   existence	   through	   time	  (genidentity).	   If	   organisms	   are	   to	   count	   as	   individuals,	   then	   the	   first	   two	  criteria	   are	   much	   too	   restrictive.	   In	   point	   of	   fact,	   many	   organisms	   totally	  exchange	   their	   substance	   several	   times	   over	   while	   they	   retain	   their	   indi-­‐viduality.	   Others	   undergo	   massive	   metamorphosis	   as	   well,	   changing	   their	  structure	  markedly.	   If	   organisms	  are	  paradigm	   individuals,	   then	   retention	  of	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neither	  substance	  nor	  structure	  is	  either	  necessary	  or	  sufficient	  for	  continued	  identity	   in	   material	   bodies.	   The	   idea	   that	   comes	   closest	   to	   capturing	  individuality	   in	  organisms	  and	  possibly	   individuals	  as	  such	   is	  genidentity.	  As	  its	  name	  implies,	  this	  criterion	  allows	  for	  change	  just	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  sufficiently	  continuous.	  The	  overall	  organization	  of	  any	  entity	  can	  change	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  disrupted	  too	  abruptly.	  (Hull	  1992)7	  	  Elsewhere	  Hull	  expresses	  a	  similar	  defense	  of	   the	  concept	  of	  genidentity	   (Hull	  1986).8	  One	   might	   be	   surprised	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   Hull,	   arguably	   the	   most	   influential	   of	   all	  philosophers	  of	  biology	   in	   the	  twentieth	  century,	  explicitly	  used	  this	  notion	  to	  express	  one	   of	   his	   most	   famous	   theses	   (about	   the	   identity	   of	   living	   things)	   without	   having	  aroused	  much	  enthusiasm.	  Indeed,	  as	  we	  said	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  the	  notion	  of	   genidentity	   is	   rarely	   used	   by	   philosophers,	   philosophers	   of	   biology	   included	   (as	   an	  illustration,	  “genidentity”	  has	  only	  two	  occurrences,	  from	  1986	  to	  today,	  in	  Biology	  and	  
Philosophy,	  arguably	  the	  leading	  journal	  in	  philosophy	  of	  biology),	  and	  even	  Hull	  did	  not	  change	   that	  situation.	   Is	   it	  because,	  here	  again,	   the	  notion	  of	  genidentity	  would	  be	   too	  imprecise?	  We	  believe,	  on	   the	   contrary,	   that	  Hull	  offers	  a	   rather	  precise	  and	   inspiring	  conception	  of	  genidentity,	  and	   that	   the	  reason	   that	   this	  conception	  has	  not	  been	  more	  successful	  lies	  elsewhere,	  namely,	  in	  its	  unusual	  metaphysical	  implications.	  Our	  strategy	  here,	   therefore,	   will	   be	   to	   reconstruct	   Hull’s	   conception	   of	   genidentity,	   and	   then	   to	  extend	  it	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  several	  biological	  cases	  and	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  uses	  of	  genidentity	  in	  physics.	  	  	  In	  our	   view,	  what	   is	   probably	  Hull’s	  most	   famous	  paper	   (Hull	   1978)	  offers	  one	  of	   the	  best	  possible	  argumentations	  in	  favor	  of	  biological	  genidentity.	  This	  article	  is	  often	  seen	  as	   a	   defense	   of	   the	   theses	   that	   species	   should	   be	   seen	   evolutionarily	   as	   individuals	  rather	  than	  classes	  and	  that,	  consequently,	  there	  is	  no	  “human	  nature,”	  no	  “essence”	  of	  humanity,	  if	  humans	  are	  understood	  as	  members	  of	  the	  species	  Homo	  sapiens	  (on	  Hull’s	  and	   Ghiselin’s	   “individuality	   thesis,”	   see	   Haber,	   this	   volume).	   These	   theses	   are	  undeniably	   important,	  but	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  most	  crucial	  component	  of	  this	  paper	   is	  the	  series	  of	  diagrams	  drawn	  by	  Hull,	   and	   the	  conception	  of	   identity	  upon	  which	   they	  depend,	   that	   is,	   genidentity.	   Hull	   seeks	   a	   criterion	   of	   identity	   through	   time	   for	   living	  things.	  His	  thesis	  is	  that	  any	  organism	  or	  any	  species	  is	  a	  space-­‐time	  portion,	  a	  “branch”	  on	  the	  tree	  of	  life,	  with	  a	  beginning	  and	  an	  end,	  with,	  between	  the	  two,	  a	  continuous	  line	  of	   different	   states.	   Hull	   argues	   that,	   because	   living	   things	   can	   undergo	   massive	   and	  unpredictable	   change,	   sameness	   and	   self-­‐resemblance	   are	   inappropriate	   criteria	   for	  biological	  identity	  (Hull	  1978,	  345).	  He	  recalls	  that	  certain	  stages	  in	  some	  organisms	  are	  so	   different	   that	   biologists	   had	   placed	   them	   in	   different	   species,	   genera,	   families,	   and	  classes,	  before	   they	  could	  realize	   that	   those	  stages	  were	   in	   fact	   the	   transformations	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  organism.	  For	  living	  things,	  being	  the	  same	  cannot	  mean	  looking	  like	  oneself,	  and	  therefore	  the	  only	  possible	  criterion	  for	   identity	   in	  biology	   is	  continuity	  of	  
change	   (“Phenotypic	   similarity,	   says	   Hull,	   is	   irrelevant	   in	   the	   individuation	   of	  organisms.”)	  	  	  Hull’s	  diagrams	  offer	  a	  description	  of	  structural	  patterns	  of	  change	   in	   the	   living	  world,	  applicable	  to	  both	  organisms	  and	  species,	  because	  organisms	  and	  species	  belong	  to	  the	  same	   ontological	   category	   insofar	   as	   they	   both	   are	   spatiotemporally	   localized	   living	  things.	  A	  first	  set	  of	  structural	  changes	  concerns	  change	  of	  a	  living	  entity,	  or	  its	  splitting	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into	  two	  living	  entities	  (see	  figure	  16.3	  and	  table	  16.3).	  What	  is	  Hull’s	  criterion	  to	  postu-­‐late	  the	  potential	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  entity?	  His	  criterion	  is	  the	  degree	  of	  disruption	  of	  
internal	  organization.	  Of	  course,	  this	  criterion	  is	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  apply,	  and	  by	  	  














































revolution 	  definition	  the	  observer	  often	  faces	  a	  continuum	  of	  possible	  situations,	  but	  the	  examples	  	  given	  by	  Hull	  help	  us	  understand	  how	  to	  apply	  his	  view.	  In	  case	  1a,	  Hull	  explains	  that	  a	  living	  entity	  can	  remain	  the	  same	  even	  if	  it	  undergoes	  a	  radical	  change,	  provided	  that	  the	  continuity	  between	  these	  different	  states	  can	  be	  established	  (e.g.,	  a	  caterpillar	  becoming	  a	  butterfly).	  Case	  1b	  corresponds	   to	  splitting:	  one	   individual	  becomes	   two	   individuals,	  and	   the	   initial	   individual	   disappears	   as	   such.	   Transverse	   fission	   in	   paramecia	   is	   an	  example.	  Case	  1c	  corresponds	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  an	  individual	  on	  another	  individual,	  with	   the	   new	   individual	   becoming	   progressively	   autonomous.	   An	   example	   is	  strobilization	   in	   certain	   forms	   of	   Scyphozoa	   (sometimes	   colloquially	   called	   “true	  jellyfish”).	  In	  case	  1d,	  a	  small	  part	  of	  an	  individual	  (contrary	  to	  case	  1c,	  this	  is	  a	  part	  of	  an	  individual,	  not	  a	  growing	  individual	  on	  an	  individual)	  gains	  independence	  and	  becomes	  itself	  a	  new	  individual.	  An	  example	  is	  budding	  in	  Hydrozoa	  (Hydrozoa	  are	  Cnidaria	  that,	  at	  least	  for	  most	  of	  them,	  have	  both	  a	  polypoid	  and	  medusoid	  stage	  in	  their	  life	  cycles).	  Admittedly,	   it	   is	  not	  trivial	  to	  differentiate	  clearly	  between	  1c	  and	  1d,	  because	  it	   is	  not	  easy	  to	  make	  the	  distinction	  between	  a	  growing	  individual,	  and	  a	  growing	  part	  that	  will	  become	  an	  individual.	  But	  the	  difference	  between	  1b	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  1c	  and	  1d	  on	  the	  other	  is	  clear:	  the	  case	  is	  1b	  if	  and	  only	  if	  the	  initial	  individual	  is	  lost	  and	  its	  internal	  organization	  is	  disrupted.	  In	  the	  two	  latter	  cases,	  the	  initial	  individual	  has	  certainly	  lost	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something	   (a	   growing	   new	   “individual”	   in	   1c,	   a	   “small	   portion”	   in	   1d),	   but	   it	   is	   still	  present	  and	  its	  internal	  organization	  has	  remained	  roughly	  the	  same.	  Naturally,	  material	  
continuity	   exists	   between	   parents	   and	   offspring,	   but	   a	   parent	   and	   its	   offspring	   are	  characterized	  by	  two	  different	   internal	  organizations,	  and	  this	  is	  precisely	  the	  criterion	  that	   makes	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   continuity	   of	   one	  being	   and	   the	   continuity	   of	  several	  beings	  through	  reproduction.	  
	  2a	   2b	   2c	  Figure	  	  	  16.4	  	  Total	   or	   partial	  merging	   between	   organisms,	   or	   between	   species	  Based	   on	  Hull	   1978.	  	  A	  second	  set	  of	  structural	  changes	  concerns	  the	  merging	  of	  two	  living	  entities,	  or	  of	  their	  parts	   (see	   figure	  16.4	   and	   table	  16.4).	  Here	   again,	   it	   is	   the	   examples	   analyzed	  by	  Hull	  that	  help	  clarify	  his	  view.	  In	  case	  2a,	  two	  entities	  fuse	  to	  become	  one	  single	  entity,	  and	  they	  remain	  one	  entity	  for	  a	  significant	  time,	  so	  the	  two	  initial	  individuals	  are	  lost	  (that	  is	  why	  fusion	  in	  amoebas	  will	  often	  not	  count	  as	  an	  adequate	  illustration	  of	  2a,	  while	  the	  fusion	  of	   two	  germ	  cells	  will	   do).	   In	   case	  2b,	   a	  portion	  of	   a	   first	   individual	  becomes	  a	  portion	  of	  a	  second	  individual,	  and	  the	  two	  individuals	  continue	  their	  existence,	  but	  both	  have	  changed	  (the	  first	  has	  lost	  a	  part,	  the	  second	  has	  gained	  a	  part).	  Blood	  transfusion	  or	  bacterial	  conjugation	  are	  good	  examples.	  In	  case	  2c,	  a	  portion	  of	  a	  first	  individual	  and	  a	  portion	  of	  a	  second	  individual	  merge	  to	  form	  a	  third	  (new)	  individual,	  while	  the	  two	  initial	  individuals	  continue	  their	  existence.	  Sexual	  reproduction	  is	  a	  good	  example.	  If	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  species,	  a	  good	  example	  of	  2b	  is	  introgression,	  and	  a	  good	  example	  of	  2c	  is	  speciation	  by	  polyploidy	  (a	  rather	  common	  event	  in	  plants,	  for	  instance).	  	  	  Table	  16.4	  Applications	  of	  Figure	  16.4	  to	  Different	  Cases	  of	  Organisms	  and	  Species	  










Introgression Speciation by polyploidy  	  It	  should	  now	  be	  apparent	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  impressive	  features	  of	  Hull’s	  paper	  is	  the	  richness	   of	   its	   examples.	   It	   is	   indeed	   these	   examples	   that	   give	   us	   the	   key	   for	  understanding	  Hull’s	   conception	   of	   genidentity:	   because	   living	   individuals	   can	   change	  massively	  and	  because	  nothing	  in	  them	  seems	  to	  be	  entirely	  “fixed”	  for	  their	  entire	  life,	  the	   only	   way	   to	   account	   for	   the	   identity	   through	   time	   of	   living	   individuals	   is	   to	  determine	   to	   what	   extent	   they	   remain	   one	   entity,	   with	   an	   internal	   organization	   that	  remains	  practically	  the	  same	  or	  changes	  progressively.	  Of	  course,	  more	  precise	  accounts	  of	  what	  “internal	  organization”	  is	  are	  needed.	  But,	  first,	  Hull	  does	  give	  us	  hints	  as	  to	  how	  this	   internal	   organization	   is	  maintained	   or	   disrupted,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   organisms	   and	   of	  species,	  respectively	  (for	  example,	  the	  measure	  of	  the	  extension	  of	  gene	  exchange	  in	  the	  case	   of	   species:	   Hull	   1978,	   349).	   Second,	   Hull’s	   main	   idea	   seems	   extremely	   clear:	   he	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rejects	   every	   conception	   of	   identity	   (of	   an	   organism	  or	   a	   species)	   based	   on	   substance	  (i.e.,	   the	   idea	   that	   “something”	   remains	   in	   an	   individual	   despite	   its	   changes)	   and	  
resemblance	   (i.e.,	   the	   idea	   that	   X	   is	   the	   same	   if	   it	   looks	   sufficiently	   like	   itself).	  Importantly,	  we	   believe	   that	  Hull’s	   view	   is	   opposed	   both	   to	   essentialist	   substantialism	  (the	  idea	  that	  a	  permanent	  “core”	  or	  “substrate”	  of	  X	  remains	  through	  time)	  and	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  functional	  substantialism	  defended,	  in	  particular,	  by	  Wiggins,	  because	  Hull’s	  view	  is	   incompatible	  with	   the	   idea	   that	  each	   individual	  must	  be	  understood	   in	  relation	   to	  a	  sortal	  concept,	  each	  “sort”	  being	  characterized	  by	  a	  common	  “law	  of	  activity”	  (Wiggins	  2011,	  57).	  	  	  Table	   16.5	   sums	   up	   the	   different	   conceptions	   of	   identity	   discussed	   here,	   their	  applications	  to	  the	  living	  world,	  and	  some	  of	  their	  proponents.	  	  Table	  16.5	  Different	  Concepts	  of	  Identity,	  and	  Their	  Application	  to	  the	  Living	  World	  
Conceptions Substantialism Identity-resemblance Genidentity 
“Moto” Something of X remains 
through time 
X looks sufficiently like itself X is defined by 
sufficiently continuous 
states 
Examples in biology - Genetic identity 
- “Essence” of a species 
- Self-resemblance for an 
organism 




Proponents Many proponents of 
genetic identity (e.g., 
Jacob 1982; to some 
extent Dawkins 1976) 
and genetic essentialism 
(see Kripke 1980) 
- Pheneticism (for species) - Hull (1978, 1992) 
- Boniolo and Carrara 
(2004) 
	  So	  Hull	   is	   undeniably	   the	   philosopher	  of	   biology	  who	  offered	   the	   strongest	   defense	  of	   the	   notion	   of	   genidentity	   applied	   to	   the	   living	   world.	   Yet	   we	   think	   that	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  go	  even	  further	   in	  Hull’s	  direction.	  	  
	  3a	   3b	   3c	  Figure	  	  	  16.5	  	  Forms	   of	   integration	   of	   external	   biological	  material,	   at	   the	   organism	  level	   or	   the	   species	  level.	  The	   first	  case	   corresponds	   to	  Hull’s	   2a	   (fusion),	   the	  second	   to	  Hull’s	   2b	   (integration	  with	  continuation),	  while	   the	   third	   case	   is	   an	  inversion	   of	  Hull’s	   1c.	  The	   third	   case	   (absent	   in	  Hull’s	  analysis)	   can	   be	   called	  “internalization,”	   and	   is	   described	   in	   this	   chapter	   as	   an	   extremely	   frequent	  (though	  long	   overlooked)	   phenomenon	   in	   nature	  	  Indeed,	   one	   additional	   argument	   can	   strengthen	   Hull’s	   view	   decisively.	   It	   concerns	  the	   integration	   of	   external	   components,	   in	   particular	   symbiotic	   components,	   into	  living	   things.	   	   Symbiosis	   is	   entirely	   missing	   in	   Hull’s	   picture,	   except	   for	   the	   rapid	  mention	  of	   the	  endosymbiotic	  origin	   of	   certain	   organelles	  	  (Hull	   1978,	   346).	   This	   is	  not	   really	   surprising,	  as	   it	   is	  only	  recently	   that	  symbioses,	  long	   thought	   to	  be	  rather	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rare	   events,	   have	   been	   recognized	   as	   extremely	  widespread	   in	   nature	   (e.g.,	   McFall-­‐Ngai	  	   2002).	  Symbiotic	  elements,	  and	   especially	   symbiotic	  bacteria,	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  decisively	   influence	  the	  ontogeny	  and	  phylogeny	   of	  many	   organisms	   (McFall-­‐Ngai	  2002,	   Pradeu	   and	   Carosella	  2006,	  Dupré	  and	  O’Malley	  2009,	  Gilbert	  and	  Epel	  2009,	  Bouchard	   2010,	   Pradeu	   2011).	   Mammals,	   for	   example,	   are	   90%	   constituted	   by	  bacterial	   cells	   and	   only	   10%	   by	   eukaryotic	   cells,	   and	   mutualistic	   bacteria	   are	  indispensable	   for	   digestion,	   immunity,	   metabolism,	   and	   development.	   The	  indispensability	   of	  symbionts	   is	   in	   fact	  a	  phenomenon	   that	   can	  be	   found	   in	  virtually	  all	  animals	   	   (McFall-­‐Ngai	   	   et	   	   al.	   	   2013)	   and	  plants	   	   (Oldroyd	   	   	  2013).	   	   	  We	   	   	  suggest	  	  	  that	   	   	   the	   	   	  ubiquity	   	   	   of	   	   	   symbiosis	   strengthens	   the	   genidentity	  view,	  making	  Hull’s	  diagrams	   switch	   from	   “weird	   and	   rare”	   to	   “weird	   and	   common,”	   at	   both	   the	  organism	  and	   the	  species	   levels.	   Indeed,	  because	  symbionts	  are	  decisively	   involved	   in	  the	  ontogeny	  and	  phylogeny	  of	  most	   living	   things,	  cases	  2a	  (fusion)	  or	  2b	  (integration	  with	   continuation)	   or,	   even	   more	   frequently,	   “inverted	   1c”	   (internalization)	   are	  extremely	  widespread	   in	  nature	   (see	   figure	  16.5).	   In	   the	  biological	  world,	   the	  need	   to	  integrate	  foreign	  (cross-­‐kingdom)	  living	  things	  is	  the	  rule,	  not	  the	  exception.	  	  	  What	   should	   one	   deduce	   from	   this	   importance	   of	   symbiosis	   in	   nature?	   In	   order	   to	  understand	  what	  a	  living	  thing	  X	  is	  (be	  it	  an	  organism	  or	  a	  species),9	  one	  needs	  to	  study	  X	  with	  its	  symbionts	  (e.g.,	  Moya	  et	  al.	  2008),	  that	  is,	  the	  “heterogeneous	  organism”	  or	  the	  “heterogeneous	  species”	  (Pradeu	  2012).	  In	  particular,	  the	  genome	  of	  a	  living	  thing	  X	  by	  itself	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  understand	  what	  X	  is	  and	  does.	  This	  is	  what	  can	  be	  called	  “the	  revolution	  of	  the	  microbiome”	  (the	  “microbiome”	  refers	  to	  the	  collective	  genomes	  of	  all	  the	   microorganisms	   living	   in	   our	   bodies	   (Turnbaugh	   et	   al.	   2007))	   or,	   perhaps	   more	  adequately,	  “the	  revolution	  of	  collective	  genomes,”	  with	  metagenomics	  as	  a	  particularly	  useful	   set	   of	   tools	   (Dupré	   and	  O’Malley	  2007,	   2009):	   in	  most	   cases,	   living	   entities	   are	  composite	  entities,	  expressing	  genomes	  coming	  from	  different	  species,	  even	  indeed	  from	  different	   kingdoms	   (Pradeu	   2012,	   Bapteste	   2014).	   In	   addition,	   it	   is	   indispensable	   to	  study	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   acquisition	   of	   these	   symbionts,	   that	   is,	   how	   an	   organism	  acquires	   symbiotic	  entities	   through	  development	   (McFall-­‐Ngai	  et	  al.	  2013),	   and	  how	  a	  species	   incorporates	   symbiotic	   entities	   through	   evolution	   (e.g.,	   Margulis	   and	   Sagan	  2002,	   Bright	   and	   Bulgheresi	   2010).	   Humans,	   for	   example,	   acquire	   different	   types	   of	  bacteria	   throughout	   their	   life,	   and	   these	   bacteria	   influence	   their	   development,	  metabolism,	   and	   health	   (e.g.,	   Scholtens	   et	   al.	   2012).	   As	   a	   consequence,	   an	   organism	  cannot	  be	  biologically	  defined	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  a	  single	  and	  constant	  genome,	  or	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  self-­‐resemblance,	  and	  therefore	   it	  seems	  that	  only	  genidentity	  can	  account	   for	  this	   dynamic	   biological	   identity	   through	   time,	   by	   capturing	   the	   complex	   processes	   of	  symbiont	  acquisition	  at	  the	  organism	  level.	  But	  the	  genidentity	  view	  is	  equally	  pertinent	  at	  the	  species	  level,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  many	  examples,	  including	  the	  growing	  recognition	  of	  different	  important	  forms	  of	  introgression	  in	  prokaryotes	  (in	  particular	  gene	  transfer	  agents,	  conjugative	  elements,	  outer	  membrane	  vesicles,	  viruses,	  plasmids,	  etc.	  [Bapteste	  2014]),	  and	  the	  study	  of	   the	  role	  of	  endogenous	  viruses	   in	   the	  evolution	  of	   their	  hosts	  (Roossinck	  2011,	  Stoye	  2012).	  In	  all	  these	  cases,	  only	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  continuous	  change,	  in	  the	   double	   sense	   of	   a	   continuity	   of	   states	   and	   a	   sufficiently	   progressive	   dynamics	   of	  change,	  enables	  us	   to	   follow	   in	  details	  what	   contributes	   to	   the	  construction	  of	  a	  given	  living	   thing.	   Therefore,	   the	   genidentity	   view	   seems	   the	   best	   suited	   to	   account	   for	   the	  identity	  through	  time	  of	  living	  things,	  and	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  symbiosis	  shows	  that	  Hull	  was	  even	  more	  right	  than	  could	  have	  been	  appreciated	  at	  the	  time	  he	  expressed	  his	  view.	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  We	   hope	   that	   we	   have	   now	   convinced	   the	   reader	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   genidentity	   is	  potentially	  extremely	  relevant	  to	  understand	  identity	  through	  time	  both	  in	  physics	  and	  in	   biology.	   But	   at	   this	   point	  we	  would	   like	   to	   draw	   attention	   to	   the	  way	   the	   physical	  cases	   studied	   in	   section	   16.3	   shed	   light	   on	  what	   has	   been	   said	   in	   the	   present	   section	  about	  biological	  cases.	  From	  simply	  potentially	  relevant,	  this	  analogy	  makes	  genidentity	  actually	   relevant	   to	   biology.	   A	   preliminary	   remark	   is	   that	   the	   physical	   cases	   above	  showed	  us	  that	  the	  most	  significant	  challenge	  for	  anyone	  trying	  to	  apply	  the	  genidentity	  view	  is	  to	  determine	  what	  process	  needs	  to	  be	  followed,	  and	  how.	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  same	   challenge	   is	  met	   in	  biology.	  And,	  here	   again,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	  biologist	   should	  follow	   a	   causally	   significant	   process—for	   instance	   (as	   suggested	   by	   Hull)	   internal	  organization.	  At	   the	  organism	  level,	   internal	  organization	  can	  be	  measured	   in	   terms	  of	  intensity	  of	  interactions	  and	  cohesiveness.	  A	  more	  precise	  suggestion	  would	  be	  to	  follow	  well-­‐specified	  metabolic	   interactions,	  which	  themselves	  contribute	  to	  the	  cohesiveness	  of	  the	  organism	  (see	  Dupré	  and	  O’Malley	  2009).	  Or	  perhaps	  one	  should	  follow	  metabolic	  interactions	   and	   higher-­‐level	   interactions	   that	   themselves	   exert	   control	   on	   these	  metabolic	   interactions:	   for	   instance,	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   action	   of	   the	   immune	  system	  can	  play	  a	  very	  important	  role	  in	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  genidentity	  view,	  because	  the	  immune	  system	  would	  exert	  a	  control	  on	  metabolic	  interactions,	  and	  detect	  and	  react	  to	  any	  rapid	  change	  in	  the	  organism	  (Pradeu	  2012,	  248–249).	  At	  the	  species	  level,	  internal	  organization	  can	  be	  measured	   in	   terms	  of	   intensity	  of	  gene	  exchange	  (again,	   following	  Hull),	   but	   other	   forms	   of	   transmissions	   of	   biological	   material	   could	   be	   envisioned	  (membranes,	   epigenetic	   marks,	   etc.)	   In	   all	   these	   cases,	   what	   matters	   is	   the	   causal	  process	   that	   biologists	   study:	   how	   organisms	   are	  maintained	   through	   time	   via	   physi-­‐ological	   and	  metabolic	  processes,	   or	  how	  species	  are	  maintained	   through	   time	  via	   the	  interbreeding	  of	  organisms.	  	  But	   the	  physical	   cases	  can	  shed	   light	  on	   the	  biological	   cases	  examined	  here	   in	  a	  much	  more	   specific	   way.	   It	   seems	   in	   fact	   possible	   to	   draw	   an	   analogy	   between	   the	   two	  categories	  of	  cases.	  In	  drawing	  this	  comparison,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  least	  useful	  case	  taken	  from	  physics	  is	  the	  first	  one,	  that	  of	  the	  individual	  soliton	  (the	  free	  individual).	  The	  idea	  of	   something	   that	  would	  have	  no	   interaction	  with	   its	   environment	  makes	  no	   sense	   in	  biology,	   and	   even	   the	   idea	   of	   something	   that	   would	   interact	   with	   its	   environment	  without	  being	  itself	  modified	  whatsoever	  by	  this	  interaction	  seems	  difficult	  to	  conceive	  (though	   perhaps	   Dawkins’s	   definition	   of	   a	   selfish	   gene	   as	   an	   “immortal	   coil,”	   or	   “any	  proportion	   of	   chromosomal	   material	   that	   potentially	   lasts	   for	   enough	   generations	   to	  serve	  as	  a	  unit	  of	  natural	  selection,”	  comes	  close	  to	  the	  idea	  [Dawkins	  1976,	  28]).	  But	  the	  second	  physical	  case	  is	  much	  more	  relevant.	  In	  the	  second	  case,	  we	  were	  interested	  in	  a	  continuously	  changing	  wave,	  and	  we	  saw	  that	  the	  key	  question	  was,	  what	  rate	  of	  change	  makes	  us	   consider	   that	  X	   remains	   the	   same	   individual	   through	   time,	   and	  what	  rate	  of	  change	  makes	  us	  consider	  that	  we	  do	  not	  face	  the	  same	  X?	  This	  shift	  from	  the	  question	  of	  the	  degree	  of	   change	   to	   the	   question	   of	   the	   rate	  of	   change	   is	   exactly	  what	   illuminates	  Hull’s	  diagrams.	  It	  is,	  in	  particular,	  at	  the	  very	  basis	  of	  diagram	  1a:	  X	  can	  change,	  and	  it	  can	   even	   change	   massively,	   as	   long	   as	   the	   change	   is	   progressive	   enough	   to	   make	   us	  certain	  that	  it	  is	  indeed	  the	  same	  individual.	  But	  the	  same	  principle	  also	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	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of	   all	   Hull’s	   diagrams:	   in	   all	   cases,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   rate	   of	   “internal	   organization”	  disruption	  will	   be	   critical	   to	  determine	  whether	  we	   are	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  one	  or	   two	  individuals—or	   perhaps	   of	   no	   individual	   at	   all.	   Finally,	   the	   third	   physical	   case	   is	   also	  very	   pertinent	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   biological	   cases.	   In	   one	   of	   the	   cases	   of	   the	   third	  category,	   two	   individuals	   interact,	   and	   it	   is	   only	   the	   nature	   of	   their	   interaction	   that	  enables	  us	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  two	  individuals	  have	  changed,	  and	  whether	  we	  still	  have	  two	  individuals	  anyway—for	  instance,	  solitons	  can	  fuse,	  as	  we	  saw.	  It	  is	  exactly	  this	  idea	  that	  lies	  of	  the	  heart	  of	  all	  the	  cases	  of	  biological	  fusion	  that	  we	  have	  examined.	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  difference	  between	  2a	  (two	  individuals	  fuse	  into	  one	  new	  indi-­‐vidual)	   and	   2b	   (one	   part	   of	   an	   individual	   A	   becomes	   part	   of	   individual	   B),	   the	   only	  resource	  we	  have	  is	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  genidentical	  processes	  that	  we	  were	  
following	  have	  been	  disturbed.	  In	  2b,	  we	  say	  that	  the	  two	  individuals	  A	  and	  B	  are	  still	  the	  “same”	   individuals	  A	  and	  B	  (even	  though	  A	  has	   lost	  a	  part	  and	  B	  has	  gained	  this	  same	  part)	  because	   the	  rate	  of	  change	  in	   the	   internal	  organization	  of	  A	  has	  not	  been	  signifi-­‐cantly	  disrupted	  (and	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  B).	  It	  is	  also	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  interaction	  that	  will	   tell	   us	   if	   we	   are	   in	   a	   case	   like	   2a	   (fusion	   of	   two	   individuals;	   the	   two	   “former”	  individuals	   no	   longer	   exist)	   or	   “inverted	   1c”	   (one	   individual	   is	   integrated	   into	   an	  individual;	  the	  “host”	   individual	  still	  exists,	  having	  been	  modified	  but	  not	  destroyed	  by	  this	   integration)	  (see	  figure	  16.5).	   In	  the	  case	  “inverted	  1c,”	   the	  rate	  of	  change	  has	  not	  been	  massively	  disturbed	  by	  the	  interaction	  (though,	  of	  course,	  the	  change	  itself	  can	  be	  very	   significant,	   as	  when	   symbionts	   can	   induce	   a	   specific	  morphogenesis	   in	   the	  host),	  while	  in	  case	  2a,	  we	  talk	  about	  a	  true	  fusion	  because	  a	  new	  genidentical	  process	  starts,	  one	  that	  will	  be	  characterized	  by	   its	  own	  features,	  and	   in	  particular	  by	   its	  own	  rate	  of	  change,	  and	  this	  new	  process	   is	  not	  the	  prolongation	  of	   former	  genidentical	  processes,	  as	   these	   former	   processes	   have	   been	   completely	   disturbed,	   and	   hence	   terminated,	  because	  of	  the	  interaction	  (as	  in	  two	  germ	  cells	  that	  fuse	  and	  form	  a	  zygote).	  	  	  To	  conclude	   this	   section,	  we	  can	  say	   that	  what	  we	  have	   learned	  by	  analyzing	  physical	  cases	   of	   genidentity	   illuminates	   in	   a	   decisive	   way	   the	   examples	   taken	   from	   biology,	  because	  they	  help	  us	  see	  that,	  even	  though	  biology	  is	  often	  perceived	  as	  less	  “abstract,”	  more	  “substantial,”	  than	  physics,	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  same	  structural	  characteristics	  that,	  in	  biology	  and	  in	  physics,	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  follow	  entities	  through	  time:	  (1)	  it	   is	  key	  to	  determine	  what	  exactly	  is	  the	  causal	  interaction	  to	  be	  followed;	  (2)	  what	  matters	  is	  less	  the	  degree	  of	  change	  than	  the	  rate	  of	  change;	  (3)	  the	  most	  interesting	  problem	  concerns	  the	   interaction	  of	   two	   genidentically	   defined	   individuals,	   and	   the	  way	   this	   interaction	  can	  disturb	  their	  genidentity.	  Therefore,	  the	  concept	  of	  genidentity	  is	  pertinent	  not	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  can	  be	  applied	  in	  interesting	  ways	  to	  both	  physical	  and	  biological	  cases,	  but	  also	   because	   it	   offers	   a	   unique	   opportunity	   to	   foster	   a	   dialogue	   between	   physics	   and	  biology.	  	  
16.5	  Genidentity	  and	  Process	  Ontology	  	  An	  ontology	   is	  not	   just	  a	  proposition	  about	   the	  kind	  of	  entities	   that	  exist	   in	   the	  world,	  but	  also	  a	  heuristic	  tool	  to	  model	  the	  world.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  now,	  the	  genidentity	  view	  orients	  us	  toward	  an	  ontology	  centered	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  change	  and	  processes,	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  ontology	  centered	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  invariant	  entities.	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During	   the	   scientific	   revolution,	   natural	   philosophers	   made	   an	   important	   move.	   As	  decisively	  emphasized	  by	  Wigner	  (1967,	  3),	  they	  “devised	  an	  artifice	  which	  permits	  the	  complicated	  nature	  of	  the	  world	  to	  be	  blamed	  on	  something	  called	  accidental	  and	  thus	  permits	   [them]	   to	   abstract	   a	   domain	   in	   which	   simple	   laws	   can	   be	   found.	   The	  complications	   are	   initial	   conditions;	   the	   domain	   of	   regularities,	   laws	   of	   nature.”	   It	   is	  difficult	   to	   overestimate	   the	   impact	   of	   this	   heuristic	   strategy.	   It	   allowed	   physics	   to	  become	   what	   it	   is	   today.	   One	   of	   the	   reasons	   it	   has	   worked	   so	   well	   is	   that,	   in	   many	  physical	   cases,	   it	  was	   possible	   to	   fairly	  well	   identify	   the	   relevant	   initial	   conditions,	   in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  related	  law	  of	  nature.	  (For	  example,	  think	  about	  how	  Galileo	  and	  Newton	  managed	  to	  put	  aside	  almost	  all	  physical	  properties	  to	  identify	  the	  few	  relevant	  ones	  in	  gravitation	  phenomena.)	  	  	  To	  explain	  this	  remarkable	  success,	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  reify	  the	  distinction	  between	  laws	  and	   initial	   conditions,	   in	   other	   words	   between	   nomic	   regularities	   and	   accidents.	   For	  example,	  we	  could	  argue	  that	   the	   laws	  are	   independent	  of	   the	  content	  of	   the	  universe,	  and	   that,	   therefore,	   they	   are	   ontologically	   distinct	   from	   accidents	   that	   depend	   on	   this	  content.	   It	   is	  what	  Helen	  Beebee	  (2000)	  called	  a	  “governing	  conception”	  of	   laws.	   If	  we	  adopt	   such	   a	   conception,	   laws	   are	   founded	   on	   metaphysical	   invariant	   features	  (universals,	   dispositions…).	   As	   brilliantly	   exposed	   by	   Aristotle	   (Physics	   3–5),	   in	   an	  ontological	  framework	  focused	  on	  what	  does	  not	  change,	  the	  main	  ontological	  problem	  becomes	   the	   nature	   of	   change.	   Without	   rejecting	   the	   distinction,	   the	   metaphysical	  alternative	   is	   to	   defend	   a	   nongoverning	   conception	   of	   laws.	   In	   order	   to	   make	   the	  distinction	   between	   laws	   and	   accidents	   not	   arbitrary,	  we	   have	   to	   use	   another	   kind	   of	  invariance	   to	   justify	   the	   status	   of	   laws.	   For	   example,	   in	   the	   Ramsay-­‐Mills-­‐Lewis	  approach,	   laws	  are	  propositions	   that	  occupy	  a	   special	  position	   in	   the	   theory	   structure	  (axioms,	   theorems…).	   What	   is	   important	   to	   note	   is	   that	   in	   all	   these	   ontological	  approaches,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  what	  does	  not	  change.	  Change	  itself	   is	  derivative.	  Change	  is	  understood	   as	   what	   happens	   when	   invariance	   fails.	   It	   is	   not	   an	   autonomous	  metaphysical	  category.	  	  	  It	  is	  today	  obvious	  that	  the	  strict	  distinction	  between	  laws	  and	  initial	  conditions	  is	  often	  not	   very	   useful	   in	   biology.	  Moreover,	   in	  many	   cases	   it	   seems	   to	   be	   an	   obstacle	   to	   the	  development	  of	  biological	  theories	  and	  models.	  If	  biology	  is	  a	  historical	  science,	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  of	  its	  propositions	  are	  contingent.	  Should	  we	  put	  all	  biological	  knowledge	  in	  the	  column	  of	  accidents,	   therefore	   in	  the	  category	  of	  what	  cannot	  be	  adequately	  explained	  or	   modeled?10	   This	   seems	   inappropriate.	   In	   the	   last	   century,	   Whitehead	   (1978)	  reminded	  us	   that	  one	  could,	  and	  still	  can,	  make	  a	  metaphysical	  choice	  here.	   Indeed,	   to	  follow	  the	  Plato-­‐Aristotle	  trend	  is	  not	  the	  only	  possibility.	  We	  could	  put	  at	  the	  center	  of	  our	  ontology	  the	  notion	  of	  change	  itself.	  Consequently,	  what	  would	  be	  derivative	  is	  not	  change,	  but	  the	  apparent	  absence	  of	  change,	  in	  other	  words	  regularities	  and	  diachronic	  identity.	  	  	  This	   ontological	   shift	   of	   perspective	   is	   rarely	   taken	   seriously,	   and	   this	   suspicion	   is	  understandable	   given	   that	   building	   an	   ontology	   centered	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   change	   and	  processes	   is	   extremely	   difficult.	   Past	   attempts	   have	   often	   been	   deemed	   obscure	   (for	  example	   Bergson	   1938,	   Whitehead	   1978).	   Recent	   moves	   toward	   an	   ontology	   of	  processes	   have	   been	   made,	   especially	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   living	   world	   (Dupré	   and	  O’Malley	  2007,	  2009,	  Dupré	  2012,	  Bapteste	  and	  Dupré	  2013),	  but	  a	  detailed	  description	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of	  how	  such	  an	  ontology	  should	  be	  built	   is	  still	   lacking.	   It	   is	  our	  claim	  that	   individuals	  defined	   solely	   by	   genidentity	   relation	   could	   be	   a	   first	   step	   toward	   getting	   over	   this	  problem.	  Functional	  genidentity	  relations,	  precisely	  grounded	  in	  science	  (which,	  as	  we	  saw,	   are	  not	   to	  be	  understood	   in	  mereological	   terms),	   could	  play	   the	   central	   role	   in	   a	  process	  ontology.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  notion	  of	  individual	  becomes	  derivative.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  a	  lot	  of	  work	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  before	  we	  could	  claim	  to	  have	  a	  contender	  to	  neo-­‐Aristotelian	   approaches,	   such	   as	   Lowe’s	   (2006)	   or	   Bird’s	   (2007).	   As	   an	   example,	   the	  ontological	  dependency	  between	  processes	  and	  events	  will	  have	  to	  be	  clarified	  in	  a	  more	  satisfying	  way	  (see	  Steward	  2013,	  though	  a	  process	  ontology	  should	  not	  be	  attributed	  to	  her).	   Are	   processes	   derivative	   compared	   to	   successions	   of	   events,	   or	   is	   the	   relation	  between	  processes	  and	  events	  more	  equal?	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  much	  work	  is	  still	  to	  be	  done,	   we	   have	   reasons	   to	   be	   cautiously	   optimistic.	   New	   metaphysical	   approaches,	  inspired	   by	   current	   science,	   for	   example	   (Maudlin	   2007),	   are	   giving	   us	   tools	   to	   go	  beyond	  traditional	  ontologies.	  Soon	  it	  will	  not	  be	  unreasonable	  to	  sustain	  that	  processes	  are	   ontologically	   prior,	   and	   individuals	   should	   be	   conceived	   of	   as	   specific	   temporary	  coalescences	  of	  processes.	  It	  is	  scientifically	  identified	  processes	  that	  will	  tell	  us	  where	  the	   individual	   lies,	   and	   what	   its	   boundaries	   are,	   and	   not	   the	   other	   way	   around.	   We	  should	   not	   start	   with	   individuals;	   we	   should	   not	   build	   our	   ontology	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  preconceived	  or	  phenomenologically	  determined	  individuals,	  because	  in	  most	  cases	  our	  intuitive	  carving	  of	  the	  world	  into	  individuals	  can	  prove	  to	  be	  misleading	  in	  science	  (in	  biology,	   see	  Hull	   1992	  and	  Pradeu	  2012;	   in	  physics,	   see	  Ladyman	  and	  Ross	  2007	  and	  French	  and	  Krause	  2006).	  (Incidentally,	  we	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  descriptive	  metaphysics—i.e.,	   describing	   the	   cognitive	   structures	  by	  which	  we	  understand	   the	  world—is	   always	  wrong.	  After	  all,	  at	   least	  pragmatically,	  our	  everyday	  ontology	   is	  very	  efficient.	  But	  we	  definitely	  sustain	   that	  such	  “anthropocentric”	  metaphysics	   tends	  to	  exclude	   innovative	  and	  important	  ontological	  propositions	  and	  revisions,	  which	  are	  often	  based	  on	  our	  best	  current	  science.)	  	  
16.6	  Conclusion	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  have	  defended	  a	  genidentity	  view,	  that	   is,	   the	   idea	  that	  the	   identity	  through	  time	  of	  an	  entity	  X	  supervenes	  on	  a	  continuous	  connection	  of	  states.	  The	  reason	  that	  has	  led	  us	  to	  this	  view	  is	  partly	  negative:	  conceptions	  of	  identity	  based	  on	  substance	  or	   self-­‐resemblance,	   which	   might	   seem	   adequate	   for	   applications	   to	   everyday	  macroscopic	   objects,	   are	   highly	   problematic	   when	   confronted	   with	   cases	   taken	   from	  current	   physics	   and	  biology.	   In	   several	   of	   the	   examples	   studied	   above,	   from	  waves	   to	  organisms,	  nothing	   really	   “remains”	   through	   time,	  which	  makes	   it	   impossible	   to	  use	   a	  substantialist	   conception	   of	   identity;	  moreover,	   the	   overall	   aspect	   of	   the	   entity	   under	  consideration	   can	   change	   so	   much	   that	   it	   seems	   impossible	   to	   use	   a	   conception	   of	  identity	   based	   on	   resemblance.	   For	   anyone	   seeking	   a	   science-­‐based	   worldview,	  therefore,	   it	   appears	   that	   genidentity	   is	   the	  best-­‐suited	   view	  of	   identity	   through	   time.	  Naturally,	   the	   difficulty	   when	   applying	   the	   genidentity	   view	   to	   specific	   cases	   is	   to	  determine	   what	   exactly	   needs	   to	   be	   followed	   and	   how.	   Yet	   we	   have	   offered	   above	  several	   examples	   in	   which,	   we	   believe,	   it	   proved	   possible	   to	   address	   this	   problem	  and,	  therefore,	  to	  apply	  the	  genidentity	  view	  in	  a	  fruitful	  way.	  We	  have	  also	  shown	  that	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there	  are	  interesting	  parallels	  between	  the	  applications	  of	  genidentity	  to	  physical	  and	  to	  biological	  cases.	  Finally,	  we	  have	   tried	  to	  show	  that	  genidentity	   leads	  us	   to	   suggest	   an	  	  ontology	  of	   processes	  	  and	  	  change	  	  rather	  	  than	  	  an	   ontology	  	  of	   laws	  	  and	  	  substances	  or	   essences.	   In	   this	   metaphysical	   conception,	   processes,	   we	   submit,	   are	   ontologically	  prior,	   and	   they	  make	  possible	   the	  delineation	   of	   individuals	   through	   time,	   in	   physics,	  in	   biology,	   and	   perhaps	   beyond.	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  Notes	  	  	  1.	   Some	  metaphysicians	   (e.g.,	  Wiggins	   2001)	   put	   into	   question	   the	   distinction	  between	   synchronic	   and	  diachronic	   identity.	   Yet	   this	   distinction	   is	   often	   useful	   in	   a	   scientific	   context,	   both	   in	   physics	   (for	  example,	   one	   could	   argue	   that	   quantum	   particles	   are	   individuals	   even	   though	   they	   do	   not	   perdure)	  and	   in	   biology	   (for	   example	   in	   the	   discussion	   about	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   part	   of	   a	   given	   organism	   at	  one	  moment	  or	   at	   two	   different	  moments:	   e.g.,	   Sober	   2000,	   154).	  2.	   Maybe	   not	   for	   long,	   since	   many	   physicists	   and	   philosophers	   consider	   fundamental	   theories,	   like	  quantum	   field	   theory,	   as	   effective	   theories,	   therefore	   not	   describing	   a	   fundamental	   ontology,	   but	   only	  applicable	  in	  a	  certain	  range	  of	  parameters.	  In	  this	  context,	  levels	  of	  description	  and	  parts-­‐whole	  relations	  could	  come	  back	  as	  important	   concepts	   in	   fundamental	   physics	   and	   not	   only	   in	   applied	   physics.	  3.	   It	   is	   not	   clear	   whether,	   for	   Lewin,	   these	   entities	   are	   themselves	   temporally	   extended	   or	   not.	  Reichenbach	   (below)	   is	   clearer	   about	   this	   point.	  4.	   Already	   in	   1928,	   Rudolf	   Carnap	   had	   expressed	   the	   same	   view.	   He	   defines	   genidentity	   as	   an	  “association	  of	  various	  	   ‘thing-­‐states’	  with	  one	  object”	  	  (Carnap	  1967	   [1928],	   252).	  5.	   The	   difficulty	   of	   defining	   wordlines	   and	   causation	   in	   the	   quantum	   context	   is	   the	   main	   reason	   that	  genidentity	  is	  not	  used	  in	  current	  physics.	  However,	  these	  obstacles	   are	   not	   present	   in	   classical	   physics	  and	   biology,	   and	   this	   is	   why	  we	   think	  that	   Reichenbach’s	   view	   can	   be	   useful	   in	   these	   sciences.	  6.	  	  More	  generally,	  we	  believe	  we	  have	  good	  reasons	  to	  doubt	  that	   the	  third	  characteristic	  needs	  to	  be	  as	  strong	  as	   required	  by	  Reichenbach.	   In	  Simon	  Saunders’s	   (2003)	   terminology,	  Reichenbach	  requires	   that	  events	   related	   by	   material	   genidentity	   refer	   to	   an	   individual	   that	   is	   absolutely	   discernible.	   Weakly	  discernible	  entities,	  provided	  they	  have	  a	  certain	  dynamics,	  could	  also	  be	  included	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  material	  genidentity.	   Since	   our	   biological	   cases	   are	   absolutely	   discernible,	   we	   will	   not	   push	   this	   discussion	  further.	  7.	  Hull	  uses	  “substance”	  to	  talk	  about	  “material	  substance”	  (i.e.,	  remaining	  materially	   the	   same).	   This	  is	   in	   sharp	   contrast	   with	   what	   the	   metaphysical	   tradition	   has	   called	   a	   “substance”:	   for	   Leibniz	  and	   Wiggins,	   for	   instance,	   an	   individual	   substance	   can	   be	  maintained	   through	   time	  while	   changing	  totally	  its	  material	  constituents	  	  (Leibniz,	  New	  Essays,	  II,	  27).	  	  We	  will	  show,	  however,	  that	  Hull’s	  critique	  of	  substance	  impacts	  many	  forms	  of	  substantialism,	  not	  just	  material	  substantialism.	  8.	   	  Hull	   also	   used	   the	   notion	   of	   genidentity	   (1975,	   261),	   but	   it	   was	   in	   a	   critique	  of	   another	   paper,	   and	  Hull	   was	   unsympathetic	   with	   this	   notion	   if	   used	   in	   the	   context	  of	   ordinary	   language	   (in	   contrast	   with	  well-­‐formulated	   scientific	  theories).	  9.	  	  In	  fact,	   the	  same	  is	  true	  at	  other	  levels	  of	  the	  biological	  hierarchy,	   for	  instance	  at	   the	   level	   of	   a	   cell	   in	  a	  multicellular	   organism,	   but	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   clarity	  we	   stick	  here	   to	   the	   two	  main	   categories	   explored	  by	  Hull.	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10.	   	  Even	  in	  physics,	  the	  scientific	   status	  of	  cosmology	  (and	  other	  “historical”	  aspects	   of	   physics)	   is	   also	  debatable.	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